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1. Introduction 
A decision on a course of action in uncertain and complex environments 
presents a great challenge for the decision maker. There can be contra-
dictory or missing cues, dynamic changes of the environment, time 
pressure and many other factors impeding the decision task. Broad 
knowledge of the underlying structure of the whole system, of its ele-
ments and their interrelations, is of great importance in order to suc-
cessfully master its development. Knowledge can be acquired through a 
continuous learning process, often based on action-outcome-feedback 
loops: experience of the system’s reaction to goal-oriented intervention 
or unexpected external disturbances provides clues pertaining to the 
interaction of system components. Wide experience within a certain 
environment is necessary to be able to anticipate new developments. 
Envision of possible future states of the system can help to prepare for 
related developments. In this context, creativity can play an important 
role as it supports thinking beyond present constraints. 
Psychological research in the area of knowledge-based decision making 
as well as creativity serves as the basis for this dissertation, which applies 
them to the context of airport security. A major challenge within this 
field is to overcome the reactive approach currently predominant: New 
security measures are implemented mostly in the aftermath of attacks, 
strengthening the system to counteract these past threats. Against this 
background it is important to develop a proactive approach to airport 
security management, forestalling possible future threats. Such an 
approach has to be based on in-depth knowledge of elements and inter-
relations of the security system and should allow inclusion of creative, 
out of the box ideas for novel attacks. The development of a software tool 
fulfilling these challenges, the so-called Scenario Builder, has been 
pursued in the course of this dissertation. The methodological founda-
tions, its functionality and use as well as possible ways to analyse the 
resulting data will be presented. 
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One obstacle to a proactive approach to airport security is the fact that 
incidents occur only very rarely. As described above, knowledge can be 
acquired through feedback loops, indicating whether or not one’s actions 
caused the desired effects. Because of the very low frequency of inci-
dents in the context of airport security it is not possible, for example, to 
change the arrangement of the security measures and evaluate the 
success on the basis of the next ten or twenty incidents. It is argued that 
the Scenario Builder offers a (partial) tool-based substitution for these 
real-world feedback-loops, allowing the user to generate plausible future 
threat scenarios, rearrange or delete security measures from the analysis 
and trace the effects on the measures involved. 
The thesis is structured as follows: Based on a description of basic 
characteristics of the airport security system, Section 2 describes funda-
mental requirements for decision making in the context of airport 
security. Section 3 lays the foundation by describing fundamentals of 
decision making. A short outline of the theoretical background is fol-
lowed by a discussion of approaches taking the real-world setting of 
decisions into account. The field of Naturalistic Decision Making is 
identified as most relevant in the context of this thesis and consequently 
is presented in more detail. The level of knowledge of the decision 
maker is of fundamental importance. In the following Section 4, psycho-
logical dimensions of the concept of creativity are presented. The focus 
of this section lies on confluence approaches to creativity and, further-
more, on the relation between creativity and knowledge.  
In Section 5 the psychological approaches are transferred to the field of 
airport security and linked to the proactive approach to the management 
thereof put forward throughout the dissertation. Airport security is 
introduced as a complex system. It is argued that proficiency and the 
ability to anticipate possible future threats are highly relevant character-
istics for decision making within the context of airport security. This 
observation necessitates the high relevance of creativity to airport securi-
ty. Currently, creativity is mostly attributed to malevolent organisations. 
If a proactive approach is to be successful, this has to change fundamen-
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tally. Finally, a short introduction to the methodologies underlying the 
developed proactive approach is outlined. 
The main part of the thesis is comprised of four publications dealing 
with different aspects of the developed approach to airport security. The 
publications are briefly introduced in Section 6 and their particular 
contributions to the central topic are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on 
the strongly interdisciplinary character of the work, reflected by the 
different disciplinary backgrounds of the journals and the book that 
published the papers. In the final Section 7 a summary of the thesis is 
provided. Contributions to the different fields of research underlying the 
publications are discussed and possible connecting points for future 
work in the field of psychology as well as aviation management are 
identified. 
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2. Requirements for Decision Making in Airport Security 
Mobility is a basic human need and fundamental to the economic and 
social welfare of a society, particularly in the face of globalisation. Relia-
ble and efficient transportation, on long as well as short distances, is a 
major enabler for this development. As far as air transportation is con-
cerned, airports offer the node through which the connection between 
ground and air transport is provided. They act as gateways through 
which access to the air transportation system is granted. During recent 
decades the air transport system has been susceptible to a broad range of 
(terrorist) attacks, motivated by a variety of intentions. This has led to the 
development of many layers of security mechanisms installed within 
airports, intended to mitigate possible attacks. The challenge for airport 
operators is to provide a hassle-free travel experience for the customer 
while, at the same time, assuring a high level of security and dealing 
with the pressure to operate cost-effectively. 
The airport security system is in itself highly complex, tying together 
security measures and personnel, national and international rules and 
regulations, diverging interests of different stakeholders and many other 
aspects. To simultaneously manage this broad range of demands, ex-
perts need to draw on in-depth knowledge of the interrelations of system 
components and the resulting behaviour of the overall system. Handling 
the system successfully is, furthermore, complicated by the ever evolv-
ing, innovative character of possible threats. The high level of creativity, 
feeding into the planning and realisation of attacks, poses a great chal-
lenge to the management of airport security. These unknown future 
threats can be met by a proactive advancement of airport security based 
on creative conception of possible threats and the identification of 
related weaknesses in the security system. 
As a decision environment, the complex airport security system can be 
characterised by certain requirements. There are two central aspects 
affecting the decision making process: knowledge of the system itself 
and creativity with regard to possible future states. Figure 1 schematises 
components relevant for the decision making process in the context of 
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airport security. Knowledge and creativity are reflected in the four boxes 
in the requirements area on the left hand side of the figure, with 
knowledge relating to the two boxes at the top and creativity to the two 
lower ones. To gain a thorough understanding of these two concepts it is 
necessary to investigate related research in the field of psychology since 
knowledge-based decision making in complex environments as well as 
human creativity are two established areas of research within this field. 
 Figure 1: Basic components of approach to airport security system 
The complexity of the airport security systems calls for an approach to 
support the decision making process based on the insights gained from 
psychological research. As mentioned above, fostering the acquisition of 
expert knowledge and inspiring creative thought are two fundamental 
means of supporting the decision maker, acting in the airport environ-
ment. These are represented by two of the three arrows in the middle 
section of Figure 1 labelled “Support”. The third arrow highlights anoth-
er important pathway by which the decision maker can be assisted in his 
task: the generation of a data base reflecting the decision space and 
allowing the user to systematically analyse relations between compo-
nents as well as effects of actions can provide support during the deci-
sion making process. 
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The ultimate goal, however, is addressed by the area on the right hand 
side of Figure 1 labelled “Actions”. Supporting decision making aims at 
improving the quality of the decision. The three boxes reflect different 
actions that can result from decisions and support the effectiveness of 
these in the context of airport security. The publications forming the 
main part of this dissertation present different steps towards reaching 
this goal. For example, how the identified decision requirements stimu-
lated the development of the Scenario Builder as a decision support tool 
is described. The different aspects supporting the decision as highlight-
ed in Figure 1 are discussed and how a data base can provide a basis for 
future-oriented decision making is demonstrated. Examples for possible 
actions are, furthermore, provided.  
The next two sections will address psychological aspects and provide a 
theoretical background for the understanding of the decision situation 
before these insights into airport security are applied in Section 5 and 6.   
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3. Decision Making in Complex Environments 
The field of decision making has evolved substantially over the past few 
centuries and even over recent decades. In this introductory section, 
historical developments leading to the current research landscape are 
traced. Based on their relevance for decision making in the complex 
setting of airport security, a number of approaches and models are 
presented in more detail. Two aspects will be highlighted throughout 
this section: the environment in which a decision task is placed and the 
domain-specific knowledge of the decision maker. Requirements of 
anticipatory thinking will be discussed from a decision making perspec-
tive. This section provides the fundamentals for the development of a 
future-oriented approach to airport security. 
3.1 Theoretical Background of Decision Making Research 
Research conducted in the area of decision making encompasses a wide 
range of topics and methods. There is “no single, universally endorsed, 
overarching theoretical framework that researchers use to organize and 
guide their efforts” (Goldstein and Hogarth 1997:3). A number of ave-
nues of interest have been followed during the last sixty years and 
directly shape the current research landscape. This section will pursue a 
focussed approach and will cover theoretical developments leading to 
today’s knowledge-based decision making theories. Goldstein and 
Hogarth (1997) as well as Newell et al. (2007) provide a broader account. 
Various approaches to structuring the research area’s history are docu-
mented in the literature. For example, Goldstein and Hogarth (1997) 
and Newell et al. (2007) differentiate between the history of judgement 
research and decision research, tracing developments in these two fields 
separately. Cohen (1993), in contrast, analyses paradigm shifts according 
to the attitude of the research community towards decision biases. He 
identifies three different approaches: the formal-empiricist, the rational-
ist, and the naturalistic paradigm. A researcher’s theoretical beliefs can 
be revealed by answering the question of which rules the mind applies 
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when making decisions, as Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier point out. They 
identify “logic, statistics, or heuristics” (2011:452) as possible answers. 
In the following, a short overview of influential concepts for the devel-
opment of the field of decision making is provided.  
Foundations of current approaches to decision making reach back some 
centuries. The concept of rational choice can be traced to a written 
exchange in the seventeenth century between the mathematicians 
Fermat and Pascal. They discussed a range of gambling problems, 
leading to the notion that, in order to make a rational choice, one needs 
to choose the option with the mathematically highest expected value 
(Newell et al. 2007). In 1738 Bernoulli (English translation: Bernoulli 
1954) suggested exchanging the objective measure of expected value with 
expected utility, a subjective measure (Cohen 1993), to better fit human 
decision behaviour.  
Drawing on the concept of expected utility, von Neumann and Morgen-
stern published their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in the mid-
twentieth century. The second edition of this book (1947) included 
axioms to test the rationality of a person’s decisions thus specifying 
“conditions under which utility could be measured objectively” (Gold-
stein and Hogarth 1997:5). Based on this work, Savage (1954) merged 
the subjective concept of utility with the notion that probabilities of 
decision alternatives are also subjective, implying that choice is based on 
a person’s subjectively expected utility (Cohen 1993). He, furthermore, 
introduced the differentiation between small worlds and large worlds as 
decision settings. Small worlds can be described as a decision situation 
under conditions of extensive information and large worlds as situations 
in which important knowledge is not known by the decision maker 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). In such an uncertain decision envi-
ronment requirements for a purely rational choice cannot be met. 
Simon (1955) also stressed the relevance of imperfect knowledge in 
decision making and added that the limited “computational capacities 
that are actually possessed by […] man” (1955:99) additionally prevent 
decisions from satisfying rational standards. From this perspective, 
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people are forced to abandon optimal decision strategies (Marewski et al. 
2010) as prescribed by the classical decision theory described above.  
Emphasizing the resulting irrationality of decision makers, Kahneman 
and Tversky developed their heuristics and biases approach in the early 
1970s (Kahneman et al. 1982). They hypothesise that  
“people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which re-
duce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting 
values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuris-
tics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and sys-
tematic errors.” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974:1124) 
The study of intuitive judgement based on heuristics and biases has 
initiated substantial interest (Kahneman 2003) and has had strong 
influences on decision making research (Gigerenzer 1996). Neverthe-
less, this rather negative view of the human decision maker as being 
prone to systematic cognitive biases has been countered by the notion 
that an approach focussing only on the decision process itself is too 
narrow and the quality of a decision cannot be evaluated on this basis. 
Simon coined a metaphor illustrating his view of the relation between 
actor and environment: “Human rational behavior […] is shaped by a 
scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the 
computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon 1990:7).  
The notion of the dependence of the quality of a decision on the condi-
tions under which it is made has inspired different researchers to inves-
tigate decision making under realistic conditions. Two approaches to 
decision making in the real world will be described in more detail in the 
following section. 
3.2 Decision Making and Knowledge in the Real World 
Historic approaches and classic decision theory pursue a rather narrow 
approach to decision making and are not capable of coping with chal-
lenges outside the context of the laboratory. Two approaches that delib-
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erately go beyond the constraints of controlled experiments are focussed 
on in the following: Naturalistic Decision Making and Fast and Frugal 
Heuristics. Both approaches include the environment as a constituent 
feature in the decision making process. Whereas the latter pursues a 
quite narrow approach, mainly focussing on the distinct decision event, 
Naturalistic Decision Making aims at a detailed understanding of the 
conditions that allow experienced decision makers to act reasonably in 
complex environments. It is thus argued, that Naturalistic Decision 
Making can offer very valuable insights in the decision making process 
relevant for the scope of this work. A special emphasis will be put on the 
role of expertise and knowledge-acquisition processes within the two 
approaches. 
3.2.1 Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
The classical justification for the use of heuristics by humans is – ana-
logue with the heuristics and biases program of Kahneman and Tversky 
– that they allow the decision maker to attain a positive trade-off between 
time and effort invested and the accuracy achieved (Payne et al. 1993). 
From this perspective, the use of heuristics has a negative influence on 
the quality of decisions because the limited effort invested can lead to 
erroneous outcomes. In contrast, Todd and Gigerenzer pursue an 
approach to heuristics in decision making that is based on the “major 
discovery, […] that saving effort does not necessarily lead to a loss in 
accuracy” (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012:26). From this perspective, a trade-
off in line with the effort-accuracy framework is no longer necessary, as 
heuristics can simultaneously be faster and more accurate. For a range 
of decision problems in the real world Todd and Gigerenzer found “an 
inverse U-shaped relation between amount of information computation, 
and time on the one hand and predictive accuracy on the other” (Todd 
and Gigerenzer 2012:27). The U-shaped relation implies that, at a certain 
point, more information does not improve the decision quality but 
harms it (for example, detailed models can overfit new data (Marewski et 
al. 2010)).  
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The reason why this less-is-more effect (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
2011) can produce positive outcomes is that heuristics are not applied 
randomly. They are adapted to suit the particular decision environment 
in which they are employed. Following Simon’s scissors metaphor, just 
as the two blades of a scissors need to fit perfectly together for the 
scissors to cut, heuristics and environments need to be adjusted for 
decision strategies to be successfully employed. Decision makers have 
individual sets of heuristics at their disposal to cope with the uncertain 
world around them (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2011). These heuristics 
exploit the evolved cognitive abilities of the decision maker (Gigerenzer 
2001) as well as the patterns of information in the environment (Todd 
and Gigerenzer 2007). A heuristic can be defined as follows: It “is a 
strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making 
decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex 
methods” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011:454). They are composed of 
a number of building blocks that determine the process of decision 
making (Gigerenzer 2001):  
• search rules: give the search for alternatives and cues a direction 
• stopping rules: specify criteria for stopping the search 
• decision rules: indicate inferences that should be made based 
on the acquired information. 
The repertoire of heuristics a decision maker can draw on has been 
labelled “Adaptive Toolbox” (Gigerenzer and Selten 2011).  
As an example, one tool in this toolbox is the so-called recognition 
heuristic. It draws on the information one can derive from the lack of 
recognition and aims at making “inferences about unknown quantities 
in the world” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 2011). The recognition heuris-
tic tells the decision maker which alternative to choose, given that one is 
recognized and the other is not. In this case the heuristics state that the 
decision maker should infer that the recognized alternative has the 
higher criterion value. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) provide an 
overview of 25 experimental studies that have recently dealt with the 
recognition heuristic.  
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The research program pursued by Gigerenzer and colleagues aims at an 
explication of the interactions of mind and world that underlie decision 
making. Advances have been described in a number of books (Gigeren-
zer et al. 1999, Todd et al. 2012, Hertwig et al. 2013). To emphasize the 
necessary fit between the environment and the heuristics described 
above the term “Ecological Rationality” (Todd and Gigerenzer 2007, 
Todd et al. 2012) has been chosen for this approach. The environment 
affects the decision maker in a number of ways. It provides, for example, 
information about the decision situation and influences the individual’s 
goals (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012). Differences in reacting to certain 
information patterns in the environment have been attributed to experi-
ence as well as personality traits and attitudes. The set of heuristics an 
individual draws on is not fixed and the contents of the adaptive toolbox 
can evolve and grow based on experience and learning (Todd and 
Gigerenzer 2012). It is, therefore, apparent that with “sufficient appro-
priate experience, performance differences can appear […] [as] experts 
know where to look and tend to rely on limited search” (Todd and 
Gigerenzer 2012:23). 
The ecological rationality approach broadened the narrow focus of 
earlier approaches to decision making. The research presented in this 
section acknowledges the fact that decisions cannot be detached from 
their specific environment, as their quality can only be evaluated in 
consideration of the conditions under which they were made. 
Knowledge acquisition through experience and learning can help the 
expert to develop a domain-specific toolbox, precisely adapted to address 
the relevant task in a fast and frugal way. The approach focusses on 
decision situations in which heuristics can be employed and concen-
trates on specific decision mechanisms. Specific decision situations are 
emphasised in the next section where a theory will be introduced that 
places emphasis on expert decision making in complex, real-world 
environments. 
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3.2.2 Naturalistic Decision Making 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) can be traced back to a workshop 
in 1989, where scientists from different backgrounds gathered, all with a 
common interest in the question of how research in decision making 
can be better adapted to real-world tasks (Klein et al. 1993). This work-
shop was the first in a series of conferences to follow (the 11th confer-
ence took place in 2013), each reflecting the continuous evolvement of 
this sub-discipline of decision making. This section will outline the 
fundamentals of NDM, touch on related decision making models and 
present recent developments in the understanding of the decision 
situation. 
3.2.2.1 Background 
In the first anthology on NDM, which was based on the 1989s workshop, 
NDM is defined as the “attempt to understand how human decision 
makers actually make decisions in complex real-world settings and to 
learn how to support these processes” (Klein et al. 1993:vii). The context 
in which decisions relevant to NDM are made can be sketched out by the 
following aspects: ill-structured problems, uncertain and dynamic 
environments, shifting and ill-defined or competing goals, ac-
tion/feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players and 
organizational settings (Orasanu and Connolly 1993). Orasanu and 
Connolly (1993) mention expertise and knowledge of the decision maker 
as further aspects central to the decision task.  
The next conference took place five years later. In this period of time the 
relative emphasis placed on the two main aspects of decision making – 
field setting and expertise – had changed. In the publication based on 
the second conference, NDM is defined as “the way people use their 
experience to make decisions in field settings” (Zsambok 1997:4). This 
declaration clearly is not compatible with models and research methods 
based on the classic decision theory described above. Thus, NDM re-
searchers had to pursue a different approach:  
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“Instead of beginning with formal models of decision making, we 
began by conducting field research to try to discover the strategies 
people used. Instead of looking for ways that people were subopti-
mal, we wanted to find out how people were able to make tough 
decisions under difficult conditions.” (Klein 2008:456) 
In a review article Lipshitz et al. (2001) specify four essential characteris-
tics of NDM. Apart from the focus on experienced decision makers, 
which he and his colleagues take for granted, NDM can be described by 
its  
• process orientation (cognitive process of decision maker), 
• situation-action matching decision rules (decision making as 
matching rather than choice), 
• context-bound informal modelling (domain- and context specific 
knowledge, sensitivity to semantic and syntactic content), and 
• empirical-based prescription (derivation of prescriptions from 
descriptive models) (Lipshitz et al. 2001). 
One important aspect of the NDM framework is the focus of interest 
beyond the isolated decision event (Orasanu and Connolly 1993). As 
demonstrated above, this notion connects the ecological rationality 
approach with NDM. Concepts drawn from cognitive psychology, such 
as schemas or mental models, are integrated into the decision process, 
making it possible to include aspects such as perception, recognition of 
situations and the development of appropriate responses in the scope of 
research. Within the framework of NDM, the understanding of decision 
making shifted from a event-oriented and “domain-independent general 
approach to a knowledge-based approach exemplified by decision mak-
ers who had substantial experience” (Klein 2008:457).  
3.2.2.2 Models 
This understanding of the decision making process is reflected in a 
number of models. They challenge the prevailing decision theories as 
they are generated by researchers who “embarked on the construction of 
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descriptive models of proficient decision makers in natural contexts 
without relying on normative choice models as starting points” (Lipshitz 
et al. 2001:333). Lipshitz (1993) presents nine different decision making 
models that were developed independently of each other and that de-
scribe aspects of decision making in various settings.  
Among those models referred to by Lipshitz (1993) is, for example, a 
model by Rasmussen (1993) who differentiates between skill-based, rule-
based and knowledge-based control of behaviour to gain a better under-
standing of human errors in complex systems. In his model of cognitive 
control, these different levels of behaviour can interact to produce situa-
tion-specific decision making procedures. The so-called image theory, 
introduced by Beach (1993), draws attention to the decision maker’s 
values and ideals. They are captured in what he calls images, defined as 
“schematic knowledge structures [used] to organize […] thinking about 
decision” (Beach 1993:151). A subset of principles, goals and plans 
relevant for a specific decision situation are represented in the so-called 
frame (Lipshitz 1993). A third model that should gain some attention in 
the years to come – called the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model 
– was developed by Klein (1993) in the course of his research on decision 
processes of fire-fighters in emergency situations. This model will be 
described in more detail in the next paragraph as it can be viewed as a 
prototypical NDM model (Lipshitz et al. 2001). 
The development of the RPD model is based on studies conducted by 
Klein and his colleagues, who found that fire-fighters were not making 
active choices, but rather “saw themselves as acting and reacting on the 
basis of prior experience” (Klein 1993:139). Furthermore, they were not 
aiming at finding the most optimal solution but at identifying actions 
that would be both efficient and applicable. These observations led Klein 
to believe that two aspects, namely situation assessment and mental 
simulation, are core processes for generating plausible actions. The 
model assumes that people organise experience in a repertoire of pat-
terns they can relate to when they have to make quick decisions. In the 
simplest variation, the decision maker immediately recognizes the 
situation and follows the obvious course of action (Klein 2008). This 
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notion builds on the hypothesis that skilled decision makers have a 
certain set of learned prototypes at their disposal, allowing them to 
immediately relate a perceived situation to an appropriate reaction and 
consequently act according to the first option identified (Lipshitz et al. 
2001). A more complex case involves the conscious evaluation of the 
possible course of action, employing mental simulation to detect possi-
ble problems that could arise from typical actions in the specific situa-
tion context. If problems are anticipated, further options are considered 
in order of their relevance until a feasible action is identified (Klein 
1993).  
The RPD model has been subject to a number of modifications, for 
example, the adaptation to different decision environments or to new 
findings (e.g. insertion of the new function “diagnose the situation” 
(Klein 1997) or integration of schemata and mental models (Liphsitz and 
Ben Shaul 1997)). 
One central requirement in the RDP model is the existence of expertise 
on the part of the decision maker. According to Klein (2008), expertise is 
stored in patterns and includes causal dependences of situations. In 
specific situations, these patterns “highlight the most relevant cues, 
provide expectancies, identify plausible goals, and suggest typical types 
of reactions” (Klein 2008:457). Thus, expert knowledge enables the 
identification of typical attributes of a situation, the development of 
mental models, the mental simulation of a course of action and the 
following anticipation of possible consequences of the co-evolution of 
situation and action (Lipshitz et al. 2001). The “RPD model underscores 
the crucial role of domain-specific knowledge or experience in proficient 
decision making. No step in the model can be executed effectively 
without such knowledge” (Lipshitz 1993:109). Of course, RPD decision 
strategies are not applicable in every decision making process. They are 
appropriate in situations that include time pressure, unstable conditions 
and an experienced decision maker. They are, for example, not suited for 
situations where the decision maker encounters highly combinatorial 
problems or alphanumerical data (Klein 1993). Klein (2008) has demon-
strated in his studies that RPD strategies are employed in 80% to 90% of 
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the decisions, on condition that the situation environment corresponds 
to the criteria described above.  
Decision making in accordance with the RPD model builds on the 
assertion that it “is primed by the way the situation is recognized […] 
[but] not completely determined by that recognition” (Klein 1993:140). 
An approach to situation awareness in naturalistic decision making 
environments is outlined in the following section. Furthermore, the 
possibility of future oriented decision making is discussed.  
3.2.2.3 Situation Awareness and Anticipatory Thinking 
Researchers interested in situation awareness (SA) regard the decision 
maker’s perception of a current decision making situation as the driving 
factor: “In most settings effective decision making largely depends on 
having a good understanding of the situation at hand” (Endsley 
1997:269). According to Endsley, SA is defined as “the perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the 
near future” (Endsley 1988:97, cited in: Endsley 1997:270). He distin-
guishes between three different phases of SA: in the first level relevant 
environmental factors are perceived, the second level aims at an under-
standing of those factors in relation to the decision makers’ goals and 
the third level relates to the achievement of an understanding of possible 
future developments of the factors.  
Limited cognitive capacities restrict the formation of SA. To circumvent 
these deficiencies the experienced decision maker can rely on schemas 
and mental models that provide means to classify specific situations. 
They can support the decision maker by guiding the attention towards 
critical cues, by evoking specific expectations concerning the future 
development of relevant factors and by providing direct links between 
characteristics of the situation and typical actions (Endsley 1997). The 
orientation towards possible future developments of the system, particu-
larly in the third level of the SA approach, is also relevant in Klein’s RPD 
model, where the experienced decision maker employs mental simula-
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tion to detect possible future complications. This aspect will be consid-
ered further in the following.  
Anticipatory thinking is defined as “the process of imagining how 
unexpected events may affect plans and practices” (Klein et al. 2010:235). 
It supports the decision maker in detecting nonobvious demands of 
possible future states and consequently helps him to prepare and posi-
tion himself for their occurrence. The ability to consolidate experiences 
and concepts is a precondition to act and react goal-oriented upon the 
environment and allows the decision maker to “guard against and 
forestall potential threats” (Klein et al. 2010:235). Anticipatory decision 
making is not only oriented towards the most likely futures but explicitly 
includes events that exhibit a low probability and a high level of threat 
simultaneously. Klein et al. (2010) describe a number of aspects which, 
in addition, are relevant for the concept of anticipatory thinking, includ-
ing its importance for planning and replanning, the generation of 
expectancies and its role in steering the attention of the decision maker. 
Expertise is guiding the attention towards relevant cues and events while 
ignoring or downplaying others since “[e]xperience and training have 
created the right patterns” (Klein et al. 2010:236).  
Knowledge acquisition thus lies at the heart of decision making whether 
or not it is explicitly future-oriented. This process can, for example, 
advance the decision maker’s attention management or improve his 
understanding of relations between factors in the environment (Klay-
man 1984). Knowledge acquisition can be inter alia supported by direct 
feedback specific to one’s actions: “If action-outcome-feedback links are 
short and frequent the individual is in a good position to learn about, and 
thus comprehend, the probable effects of action on outcomes” (Hogarth 
and Makridakis 1981:120, emphasis in original, see also: Sterman 1994). 
However, unfortunately the opposite holds true if feedback loops are 
infrequent, protracted or if the feedback received is distorted and thus 
invalid.  
The experienced decision maker is equipped with a large background of 
domain-specific knowledge allowing him to handle the demands of the 
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decision environment, no matter whether this knowledge is seen to be 
organized in a repertoire of patterns, a set of learned prototypes, or in 
schemas and mental models. Higher levels of expertise and greater 
knowledge increase the chance of decisions to be correct and thus 
successful. However there is also a negative side to this: If the prepara-
tion for a future event requires out of the box thinking, there is a danger 
that “overconfidence in our experience […] may lead us to […] miss 
something new” (Klein et al. 2010:237). Consequently, creativity can play 
an important role, if decision makers find themselves in situations 
where they have to make assumptions about possible states of the 
future. This aspect will be addressed in Section 4.  
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4. Creativity and Knowledge 
This section refers to a topic that was already dominant in the previous 
section, i.e. the interrelatedness of the human being and the environ-
ment. It will be treated here from a different perspective. In this section 
human creativity will be the main point of focus. The concept of creativi-
ty plays a major role in future-oriented airport security, the fact that the 
security threat is continuously evolving is based on the malevolent 
creativity capacities on the attacker’s side. This creativity is thus produc-
ing a demand for proactive security management. In this section, the 
theoretical foundation of creativity research will be outlined and models 
relevant to the pursued approach will be described. Special emphasis 
will be placed on the relation between learning, knowledge and creativi-
ty.  
4.1 Theoretical Background in Creativity Research   
More than 60 years ago, J. P. Guildford, a U.S. psychologist, spoke to the 
American Psychological Association (APA) in his APA presidential 
address. He chose creativity as topic, and emphasized the need for 
research in this area (Feldman et al. 1994a). In his talk he provided a 
rational and a research agenda for the study of creativity (Mayer 1999) 
and created “almost single-handedly […] psychometric interest in the 
study of creativity” (Sternberg and O’Hara 1999:252). In the following 
years Guildford himself identified aspects relevant to creative problem 
solving and developed a number of tests of creativity, mainly using 
divergent-thinking tasks. These psychometric tests allowed a comparison 
of everyday subjects on a standard creativity scale (Sternberg and Lubart 
1999). Torrance built upon the work of Guildford and developed the 
Torrance Test of Creative Thinking, which consists of verbal and figural 
tasks and can be scored for fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration 
(Sternberg and Lubart 1999). Currently, the test remains “the most 
widely used assessment of creative talent” (Sternberg 2006a:87).  
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Despite Guildford’s appeal to the research community, Feldman ob-
served in 1999 that “the amount of research on creativity has increased 
during the past two decades but still lags far behind most mainstream 
topics in psychology” (1999:169f.). A more recent account by Sternberg 
suggests that this situation still persists: “What is perhaps most notable 
about creativity research around the world is how little there is […], and 
what research there is seems to be poorly systematized” (2006b:2). 
Nevertheless, there are a number of methodologies and views beyond 
psychometric approaches that researchers commit themselves to. In the 
following section a short overview of models relevant for the scope of 
this dissertation is provided. 
4.2 Models 
Whereas Mayer (1999) structures existing views on creativity according 
to the methodologies that are employed, Sternberg and Lubart (1999) 
focus on approaches and underlying concepts of creativity. Among these 
approaches are the psychometric approaches which relate to the assump-
tion that creativity is a trait that can be measured using paper-and-pencil 
tasks (this view is shared, for example, by Guildford and Torrance). This 
approach has been criticized for using trivial and inadequate measures, 
and thus failing to capture creativity. Cognitive approaches to the study 
of creativity seek “to understand the mental representations and pro-
cesses underlying creative thought” (Sternberg and Lubart 1999:7). 
Personality and motivational variables as well as the sociocultural envi-
ronment are seen as the source of creativity in the so-called social-
personality approaches. Sternberg and Lubart argue that the understand-
ing of creativity has so far been largely dominated by unidisciplinary 
approaches, focussing only on single aspects within the overall concept. 
They promote a multidisciplinary perspective on creativity which they 
believe can be found in confluence approaches. From this perspective 
“multiple components must converge for creativity to occur” (Sternberg 
and Lubart 1999:10). Two confluence approaches will be presented in 
more detail in the following paragraphs. 
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The Investment Theory of Creativity (Sternberg 2006a, 2006c) is a 
theory, according to which creative people are those who are able and 
willing to buy low and sell high. This means that creative individuals 
pursue ideas that are unpopular or new but demonstrate a certain 
growth potential. The individual insists on keeping to the idea, even 
when facing resistance, and eventually succeeds. There are a number of 
resources that present a necessary prerequisite for creativity, including 
intellectual abilities, knowledge, thinking styles, personality, motivation 
and environment (Sternberg 2006c). According to the Investment Theo-
ry, these components interact in the process of creativity. For example, a 
particular strength in one aspect can compensate a weakness in another 
and two strong components can enhance their effect on creativity multi-
plicatively (Sternberg 2006a). Sternberg furthermore stresses the active 
role of the individual in pursuing a creative idea: “Creativity is as much a 
decision about and an attitude toward life as it is a matter of ability” 
(Sternberg 2006c:7).  
Another confluence approach that claims an even broader focus was 
developed by Csikszentmihalyi (2006). He stresses that creativity cannot 
be seen as an exclusively mental process and that, besides psychological 
aspects, social as well as cultural events need to be taken into account. In 
his Systems Theory of Creativity he describes the interaction between 
the environment in which creativity takes place and the individual and 
points out that “the audience is as important to its constitution as the 
individual to whom it is credited” (Csikszentmihalyi 2006:3). According 
to Csikszentmihalyi, the environment consists of domains and fields. 
Domains are topic-related, organized bodies of knowledge and relate to 
the cultural context. Fields specify groups of people capable of affecting 
the structure of a domain (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, cited in Feldman et al. 
1994b) and, thus, relate to the social context. According to Csikszent-
mihalyi, creativity can only occur when these components interact:  
“For creativity to occur, a set of rules and practices must be trans-
mitted from the domain to the individual. The individual must 
then produce a novel variation in the content of the domain. The 
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variation must be selected by the field for inclusion in the domain.” 
(2006:3) 
Learning plays an important role in this concept as basic instructions for 
actions within the domain are transmitted to the individual through 
learning (Csikszentmihalyi 2006). This issue is also relevant in the Social 
Psychology of Creativity Theory developed by Amabile (1996). She views 
creativity as the confluence of domain-relevant knowledge and skills, 
creativity-relevant skills and task motivation.  The aspect of knowledge in 
relation to creativity will be focussed on in the following section. 
4.3 Knowledge 
Without neglecting the general need for a confluence approach one can, 
nevertheless, focus on certain aspects of creativity. The study of single 
components of creativity, such as knowledge, can support the develop-
ment of overarching theories by providing a better understanding of 
underlying concepts and assumption. In accordance with the confluence 
approaches described above, Weisberg exclusively focusses on the aspect 
of knowledge, but recognizes it as being “necessary, not sufficient, for 
creative achievement” (Weisberg 1999:248).  
In an attempt to trace the approaches pursued by other researchers 
interested in the relation between knowledge and creativity Weisberg 
found that there is “a consistency in opinion concerning the need for 
creative thinking to go beyond the bounds of knowledge in order to 
produce true advances” (Weisberg 1999:229). He, furthermore, summa-
rizes that it is assumed that changes in the environment of individuals 
demand this adaptation capability. Knowledge of a field is presumed to 
be a prerequisite when one aims at producing something novel within 
that field. However, it is widely accepted that too much experience can 
inhibit free, creative thought. In this so-called Tension View the relation 
between creativity and knowledge is assumed to be curvilinear, shaped 
like an inverted U. According to this view, the peak of creativity of a 
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person should occur after some familiarisation with the field and before 
a deep immersion (Weisberg 1999). 
Weisberg (1999) proposes an alternative conception of the relation 
between creativity and knowledge which he labelled Foundation View. 
He suggests that knowledge and creativity are positively related to one 
another and that deep domain-specific knowledge is a requirement for 
creative thought. In support of this view, he presents a set of studies, 
mainly from fields such as painting and musical composition. These 
studies suggest that a large amount of time has to be invested in prac-
tice, internalising the advancements of others, until a noteworthy contri-
bution to the field can be observed. Thus, they document a positive 
relation between creativity and knowledge.  
The next section will introduce the field of airport security and describe 
challenges to the efficient operation of the security system. Aspects of 
NDM and theories of creativity will be linked to this field of application 
and the relevance of knowledge-acquisition and expertise as well as the 
role of creativity in forestalling possible future threats will be empha-
sised.  
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5. Supporting Decision Making in Airport Security 
Challenges specific to decision making within the airport environment 
will be the main focus of this chapter and links to the presented ap-
proaches of decision making and creativity will be provided. Moreover, 
methodological bases of a future-oriented approach to airport security 
addressing these challenges will be outlined. 
5.1 The Airport Security System as Decision Environment 
In this section, aspects of airport security are investigated further and 
related to issues touched upon in the NDM and creativity sections. It is 
argued, that deep knowledge of the structure of the airport security 
system as well as the creative development of new threat scenarios are 
prerequisites to successfully counteract possible future threats to the air 
transport system.  
5.1.1 Airport Security and Complexity 
Airport security as a system consists of a number of different entities, 
such as security technologies and activities, security personnel or the 
airport infrastructure, as well as underlying rules and regulations. 
Together they form a complex socio-technical system, aiming at prevent-
ing security incidents in the air transport system. Generally, complexity 
can be defined as being “first and foremost a matter of the number and 
variety of an item’s constituent elements and of the elaborateness of 
their interrelational structure” (Rescher 1998:1). As indicated above, 
airport security is composed of a larger number of widely varying ele-
ments that are interrelated in many areas. Airport security, thus, fulfils 
these ontic criteria for complex systems. From the epistemic point a 
view the “most plausible measure of the complexity of a phenomenon 
[…] is given by the cognitive effort we must afford in order to adequately 
grasp the phenomenon descriptively and explanatorily” (Leiber 2007:195, 
emphasis in original). Hofinger (2003) adds to this view by highlighting 
the fact that the necessary cognitive effort depends on the knowledge 
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and expertise available to a person and draws the conclusion that the 
notion of complexity is always subjective (see also Brehmer 1992).  
Effects of complexity on human decision making were already addressed 
in the NDM section, where NDM researchers were described as being 
interested in aspects relating to complex real-world settings (Klein et al. 
1993). It was, furthermore, argued, that many of the challenges decision 
makers face in the real-world can be facilitated by the acquisition of 
knowledge within their own domain. Dörner describes this notion as 
inherent to complex environments: “It is characteristic of complex 
situations that one doesn’t have complete knowledge of the situation, 
but rather that one must acquire this information while acting” (Dörner 
1980:101). Learning to deal with the large number and variety of ele-
ments within the airport security system and to (at least partially) under-
stand the underlying dependences determining the system’s behaviour 
can only be accomplished gradually. Based on the argument that the 
airport security system can be classified as a complex environment, the 
next section will analyse in more detail how the field of airport security 
relates to the body of research in NDM.   
5.1.2 Airport Security and Decision Making 
The combination of complex field settings and experienced decision 
makers describes the main focus of research in the realm of NDM. In 
Section 3.2.2.1, aspects characterising such decision contexts were 
described. They included, for example, uncertain and dynamic environ-
ments, time stress, high stakes and multiple players (Orasanu and 
Connolly 1993). These aspects were identified in typical NDM environ-
ments such as fire fighting or military operations in emergency situa-
tions. Such settings are similar to the environment which decision 
makers encounter at an airport during the occurrence of a security 
incident. However, the ultimate goal cannot be reduced to handling 
incidents efficiently but should be directed to preventing attacks in the 
first place. This is acknowledged through, for example, the introduction 
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of strict regulations on open fires in dry areas or the implementation of 
security checks.  
To be simultaneously effective and efficient, preventive measures should 
always include aspects of backward- as well as forward-oriented reason-
ing. They should be capable of analysing past attacks as well as dealing 
with potential future threats. From this aspect, Endsley’s level three SA 
(1997) and the concept of anticipatory thinking discussed by Klein et al. 
(2010) come to the fore again. Klein et al. (2010) have pointed out that 
the imagination of possible future events can provide a basis to prepare 
for potential threats. This aspect is particularly relevant in airport securi-
ty as security measures have typically been introduced as reactions to 
incidents (Sweet 2002, Salter 2008a, Poole 2009, Sweet 2009), allowing 
attackers to continuously remain one step ahead.  
Necessary requirements towards a proactive improvement of the airport 
security system are a large domain-specific knowledge-base with regard 
to system components and underlying dependences, the ability to antic-
ipate possible future threats and the means to adapt the system accord-
ing to one’s insights and expectations. Once adaptions are implemented, 
whether the changes improved the defensive capabilities of the security 
system or whether they had negative influences must be determined. 
Unfortunately, there are a few obstacles to this course of action in the 
field of airport security, particularly related to knowledge acquisition, 
action-outcome-feedback loops, and the evaluation of effects of one’s 
action.  
As demonstrated in Section 3.2.2, expertise and training are important 
prerequisites to successfully deal with decision tasks in complex envi-
ronments. Expertise is acquired through learning, which is often guided 
by direct feedback on one’s actions. This would require constant obser-
vation in order to evaluate whether the system continues to behave in 
the expected and desired way (despite or because of the implemented 
changes) and to take action if this is not the case. Within the scope of 
airport security, changes to the system could be based on the discovery 
of a possible new threat or type of threat. The main difficulty becomes 
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apparent in the evaluation phase following the implementation: Security 
incidents occur so seldom that changes made to an airport security 
system in anticipation of possible future threats (or even as reaction to 
attacks which have already occured) cannot be tested empirically for 
effectiveness. The action-outcome-feedback links are not only infre-
quent, in most cases they are simply non-existent. Another aspect fur-
ther complicates this notion. The ultimate goal of an airport security 
system is to prevent attackers from even trying to conduct an attack 
because they feel that the system is so well protected that it is not 
worthwhile. In this case the success of an improved security system 
would become apparent in the fact that its reliability is never tested at all. 
The approach developed in the course of this dissertation offers the 
opportunity to systematically create single threat scenarios as well as 
scenario clusters and analyse the security measures related to them. It is 
based on the systematic documentation of elements and relationships of 
possible threat scenarios as well as airport security measures. A software 
tool, the so-called Scenario Builder, provides the interface for the user 
und guides stepwise through the process of scenario generation. As 
soon as a scenario is completed the Scenario Builder automatically 
derives security measures specific to the chosen scenario elements. This 
approach offers intuitive access to the underlying structure of threat 
elements as well as to the interrelations between these elements and the 
airport security system. Users of the tool can interact with the security 
system, explore dependences and learn to better understand its behav-
iour.  
Moreover, the Scenario Builder has a further function: The tool offers 
the possibility to move security measures to other areas of the airport or 
to eliminate them in a virtual manner and then trace resulting changes 
in the relation to threats and security measures. For example, the walk-
through metal detector could be moved to the entrance of an airport. 
Consequently, also meeters and greeters or people intending to shop at 
the airport would have to undergo a body control. That would mean that 
attacks in the public area employing, for example, guns and grenades 
could be forestalled more effectively. The Scenario Builder can thus not 
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only (partially) substitute the missing action-feedback-loops but can, 
furthermore, support the investigation of effects of changes in the 
structure of the security system. This allows the user to acquire a better 
understanding of the system’s structure, element interrelations and the 
overall system behaviour.  
5.1.3 Airport Security and Creativity 
Creativity is a central driving force within the field of airport security. 
However, as the reactive adaptation of security measures in the after-
math of incidents described above suggests, it is not so much the creativ-
ity on the defending side (e.g. regulator or security technology industry) 
but more the creativity on the side of the attackers. Threats to the air 
transport system have greatly evolved over recent decades reflecting 
political and societal developments as well as tightening security regula-
tions. From the 1930s onwards attacks were mostly conducted by people 
fleeing their home countries and seeking political asylum. They were 
thus directed at hijacking aeroplanes (Wells and Young 2004). Terrorists 
became attracted to aircraft (especially flag-carriers) as targets during the 
1960s. Hijacking continued to be the dominant modus operandi but 
now aimed at conveying political statements (Salter 2008b). In the 
following decades the focus shifted to aircraft bombings and almost 50 
bombs were placed on aircraft between 1970 and 1990. Misusing the 
aircraft itself as a weapon of mass destruction was a new procedure in 
the 9/11 attacks (Feakin 2011). In the last decade a shift towards an 
attempted exploitation of perceived weaknesses in the security chain 
(e.g. shoe bombs, liquid bombs, printer toner bombs) has taken place. 
Reviewing the evolution of past incidents Baum concludes that “the best 
lesson the past has taught us is that the next time it will be different” 
(2011:1). 
The aspects of creativity and innovation in terrorism research have so far 
been neglected and currently remain “relatively undeveloped ideas in the 
context of terrorist behaviour” (Gill et al. 2013). One clear exception to 
this observation is the book “Understanding Terrorist Innovation: 
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Technology, Tactics and Global Trends” authored by Dolnik (2007). 
Building on detailed examples, he examines how terrorist organizations 
innovate, what strategies they employ, what means they have available 
and how successful the endeavours are.  
The terms creativity and innovation are often used interchangeably as far 
as studies on terrorism are concerned. Gill et al. base their understand-
ing of the two concepts on Amabile (1996), and define them as follows: 
“creativity refers to the generation of ideas and novel concepts, innova-
tion involves implementing these ideas” (Gill et al. 2013:130). Conse-
quently, creativity and innovation are two interrelated aspects of the 
development process of a new product or solution. Malevolent creativity 
preceding terrorist innovation is conducted with the awareness of nega-
tive consequences of the developed solution for others.  
In a conference held 2010 at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School the 
attending terrorism experts agreed on the notion that terrorist innova-
tion is regularly driven by the ambition to overcome installed counter-
measures (Rasmussen and Hafez 2010). Thus, counter-terrorism poli-
cies can be seen as “imposing the need for innovation on a terrorist 
organisation” (Gill et al. 2013:136, emphasis in original). The more 
creative the developed solutions are and the more radical the resulting 
innovations, the harder they are to anticipate: 
“Radically creative products possess the surprise factor of being 
rarely anticipated and thus provide a competitive advantage […]. In 
the same way as businesses compete with one another, the war on 
terror is seen as a dynamic struggle between law enforcement offi-
cials and terrorists to out-perform one another” (Gill et al. 
2013:134). 
Gill et al. (2013) present the 2006 transatlantic liquid bomb plot as an 
example for these dynamics. In the aftermath of 9/11 many security 
procedures were tightened and new measures, such as the bulletproof 
cockpit doors, were introduced. Thus the chance of conducting attacks in 
the manner of 9/11 became very slight. This brought forth the impulse 
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for jihadist cells to design new means by which the air transport system 
could be attacked. Bomb plots using liquid explosives in civil aircraft on 
suicide missions were developed but could, in these cases, be prevented 
through intelligence.  
As demonstrated in the example, terrorist creativity is strongly influence 
by the environment. The confluence approaches presented in Section 4.2 
were developed to take such interactions into account. From the conflu-
ence perspective, creativity can only take place when a number of differ-
ent aspects converge. Csikszentmihalyi (2006) focussed on social, cul-
tural and psychological aspects, and Sternberg (2006c) identified six 
components, such as personality, motivation and environment, on 
which creativity is based. Gill et al. (2013) analyse the conditions under 
which creativity takes place in terrorist organisations and find broad 
evidence for the need of a supportive environment, as well as motivation 
and ability on the terrorist side. It is a major challenge in the field of 
airport security to not only curtail the damage of a resulting new threat 
in the aftermath through emergency measures but also to proactively 
adapt the security system in order to principally prevent the threat. To 
reach this goal, the creative potential of regulators, security companies, 
and airport operators has to exceed the high degree of creativity dis-
played by the opponents.  
It can be difficult to think out of the box about possible future develop-
ments when one is caught in daily business and routine. The Scenario 
Builder can support the creative process leading to the generation of 
possible new threat scenarios. The tool guides the user stepwise through 
the creation of a scenario, offering specific types of scenario elements to 
choose from at each step. Once a choice is made, the Scenario Builder 
automatically continues with the next category of elements, until a 
scenario is completed. The elements offered at each step are always 
consistent with those already chosen, thus limiting the user in his 
choice. Consequently, it is only possible to select elements that can be 
combined in a plausible threat scenario. This scenario building proce-
dure supports the creativity of the user mainly because of the range of 
elements that are displayed at each step. To assemble a scenario, the 
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user must actively choose one element and dismiss others, envisaging 
the effects of the choice made on the resulting type of threat scenario. 
He might be led to choose elements he would not have thought of 
himself and to test out different possibilities to see how the resulting 
scenario unfolds. 
The structure of domains and elements and the functionality of the 
Scenario Builder as well as examples for assembled scenarios and ways 
to analyse the results are presented in the publications compiled in 
Section 6. Throughout the publications it becomes apparent how the 
acquisition of knowledge regarding the underlying system elements and 
relations can be supported through the use of the Scenario Builder and 
how creativity is fostered in the course of the scenario building process. 
In the following section the methodological background of the approach 
developed in the course of this dissertation will be described.  
5.2 Methodological Basis of the Developed Approach 
The proactive approach to airport security developed in the course of this 
dissertation is mainly based upon two established methodologies: ma-
trix-based complexity management and scenario technology. In the 
following sections these will be introduced. More comprehensive ac-
counts can be found throughout the publications in Section 6. 
5.2.1 Matrix-Based Complexity Management  
The elements and interdependences underlying the airport security 
system, consisting of threat scenario elements as well as airport security 
measures, are modelled according to a method known as Multiple-
Domain Matrix (MDM) (Lindemann et al. 2009, Eppinger and Browning 
2012). It is a matrix-based approach aiming at facilitating complexity 
management in large systems. 
A structured acquisition of system elements as well as their mutual 
dependences is supported by this approach. The system’s elements are 
grouped in domains and transferred to a matrix as row and column 
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headings, both in identical order. Two types of matrices can be differen-
tiated: Design Structure Matrices (DSM) represent elements within one 
domain, and Domain Mapping Matrices (DMM) connect intra-domain 
relationships (Steward, 1981; Danilovic and Browning, 2007). All DSMs 
and DMMs of a system together form the complete MDM. The structure 
of a documented system can be analysed visually since specific charac-
teristics of a system, such as hierarchies and feedback loops, form 
defined visual patterns in the matrix. One feature of a matrix-based 
approach is that only bilateral dependences can be documented. This 
shortcoming had to be addressed in the course of the dissertation be-
cause the airport security system cannot be reduced to interdependences 
between element pairs. To enable scenario modelling, dependencies 
between more than two elements had to be captured. This methodologi-
cal advancement is described in detail in Section 6.2. To include a 
future-oriented perspective, relevant aspects from the scenario technolo-
gy approach were identified. Fundamentals of this field are presented in 
the following section. 
5.2.2 Scenario Technology 
Scenario technology is a methodology directed towards the analysis of 
possible future developments. In the course of a scenario process, a set 
of future states is derived, reflecting plausible futures within a chosen 
field. The method has gained wide acceptance in recent years and is a 
prominent approach in the toolbox of futures research methodologies 
collected by Glenn and Gordon (2009). The approach can be defined as  
“a process of positing several informed, plausible, and imagined al-
ternative future environments in which decisions about the future 
may be played out for the purpose of changing current thinking, 
improving decision making, enhancing human and organization 
learning, and improving performance” (Chermack and Lynham 
2002:376). 
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In a typical scenario process, a number of drivers for the specific field in 
question are analysed in terms of both their possible future develop-
ments and their influences on one another. Since this is a time-intensive 
task, in most cases the number of drivers taken into account does not 
exceed more than twenty. Three or five scenarios are generally con-
structed as outcome of such a scenario process. A more detailed intro-
duction to the basic steps of a scenarios process is provided by de 
Jouvenel (2000). 
The advantage of the scenario approach lies in the fact that scenarios 
“stimulate the imagination, reduce inconsistencies, create a common 
language, structure collective thought, and enable appropriation by 
decision makers” (Godet 2000:8). However, application of this approach 
to airport security is accompanied by two major shortcomings. Firstly, 
the elements which are relevant for modeling the threat cannot be 
reduced to an amount manageable in a standard scenario process. 
Secondly, the few scenarios that result from this process are not suffi-
cient to reflect the vast variety of possible future threats to airport securi-
ty. To overcome these limitations, elements of the scenario technology 
were merged with the MDM approach to complexity management.   
5.2.3 Combination of the Two Methods 
The airport faces a large variety of potential future threats due to the 
creative potential of opposing organisations. To be able to proactively 
adapt the security system to address anticipated new threats, the nature 
of relevant threats and their interrelation to available airport security 
measures has to be understood in great detail. To fulfil this requirement, 
an approach has been developed in the course of this dissertation which 
combines elements from scenario planning and matrix-based complexity 
management methods. This permits merging the capability of systemat-
ically dealing with a large variety of system elements and complex 
underlying system structures with the competence to provide a sound 
understanding of requirements of future-oriented thinking. This new 
approach can produce a large number of threat scenarios and automati-
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cally lists all security measures related to each scenario. The large 
amount of generated data poses a new challenge to the user, means of 
comparing and interpreting the data and of deriving valid conclusions 
have to be specified. Different possibilities to deal with this challenge 
will be discussed in the publications in the next section.  
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6. Publications on Methodological Aspects of Proactive Air-
port Security Management 
This section constitutes the core of the dissertation. Different facets of 
the central theme - the proactive handling of complexity in airport 
security management - are discussed in four publications. The approach 
on which the publications are based was developed in the course of a 
research project named SiVe, which was supported by funding from the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The 
publications will be introduced in the following paragraphs and their 
different focus areas will be highlighted. 
6.1 Introduction to the Following Publications 
The papers presented in this dissertation have been released in publica-
tions from diverse disciplines, reflecting the highly interdisciplinary 
character of the approach. Paper number 1 (Cole and Kuhlmann 2012) 
was published in FUTURES, a journal specializing in medium- to long-
term future developments and methodologies of futures studies. The 
Journal of Air Transport Management, in which publication number 2 
(Cole 2014) has been released, focusses on economic, policy and man-
agement issues of the air transport system. Paper number 3 (Cole and 
Maurer 2014) has been published by The International Journal of 
Knowledge-Based and Intelligent Engineering Systems. This journal 
addresses the application of intelligent systems to complex problems. 
The fourth publication (Maurer and Cole 2012) is a chapter in the basic 
work on MDM methodology by Eppinger and Browning (2012). The case 
of the airport security system is incorporated as an application example 
for multidomain architectures in MDM. The fact that each paper is 
published in a book or journal representing a different discipline 
demonstrates that the approach, in spite of being fundamentally inter-
disciplinary, fulfills the standards of the single disciplines it relates to. In 
the following all four publications are briefly introduced. 
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Publication number one mainly focuses on scenario process-related 
aspects. A standard scenario process is presented as a starting point and 
the shortcomings of this methodology regarding airport security are 
highlighted. Elements of the MDM approach are integrated into the 
scenario process to overcome these drawbacks and the Scenario Builder 
is introduced as a means to deal with the large data base developed. First 
suggestions are made as to how the resulting threat scenarios can be 
analysed. This paper was published at an intermediate state of the 
research project SiVe and some of the details presented here differ from 
later publications (such as the number of domains and elements consti-
tuting the airport security system). A preliminary version of this paper 
has been published in the proceedings of the “Security in Futures - 
Security in Change” conference of the Finland Futures Research Centre 
(Cole and Kuhlmann 2011). 
The second publication represents the status at the end of the project. It 
takes up a MDM perspective and presents a structured framework for 
the approach developed. The different phases in building the complete 
model are described and the additional information generated with each 
subsequent step is illustrated. Phases range from the first data acquisi-
tion efforts to a detailed analysis of the results. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of the approach in the context of decision making in complex 
systems is addressed.  
Publication number three was also prepared at the end of the project. Its 
main focus lies in the analysis of the data generated through the applica-
tion of the Scenario Builder. The relevance of scenario clusters (a group 
of threat scenarios that have some identical elements) for the analysis of 
the security system is highlighted. Two types of security measures can 
be differentiated: pass-through and potentially effective measures. A 
detailed example is provided, demonstrating the usefulness of these two 
concepts as well as the overall applicability of the approach. Some of the 
aspects elaborated in this paper were initially presented at the Air 
Transport Research Society World Conference in 2011 (Cole and Maurer 
2011).  
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As an example of multidomain architectures, the fourth publication 
concentrates on a core area of MDM research: the interpretation of 
visual patterns in a matrix. Here is demonstrated how the logical struc-
ture of the scenario building process can be traced visually, reflecting the 
stepwise specification of different kinds of elements until a scenario is 
considered complete and the security measures triggered at the airport 
are derived. 
6.2 Publications 
The order of the publications presented in this section was chosen on 
the basis of their content as well as their overall complexity. The first two 
papers provide a general introduction to the approach pursued, while the 
remaining publications mainly focus on means to analyse the resulting 
data base. As mentioned above, discrepancies between the publications 
with regard to the general approach relate to the fact that the publica-
tions present different stages of work in progress. References can be 
found directly after each publication and are not transferred to the 
overall bibliography. 
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6.2.1 Publication Number 1: Cole and Kuhlmann (2012) 
Cole, M. and Kuhlmann, A. (2012). A Scenario-Based Approach to 
Airport Security. In: Futures, 44:319-327. 
A SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH TO AIRPORT SECURITY 
Abstract 
Mobility, particularly air transport, is vital to the economic stability and 
growth of a nation. It symbolizes national self-confidence and self-
conception. As a result commercial aviation remains a preferred target 
for attacks by terrorists and other offenders. Security measures intended 
to render these threats harmless have mostly been introduced in re-
sponse to specific occurrences, thus allowing the potential attackers to 
always remain one step ahead. As this approach seems inappropriate for 
dealing with future security threats, this paper provides a proactive 
approach to identification of future threats and their coverage by airport 
security processes and technologies. To meet the requirements of a 
highly complex and at the same time critical system, such as airport 
security, a standard scenario process has been enhanced by matrix-based 
methods of complexity management. This approach allows analysis of 
threat scenario clusters with respect to the number of potentially effec-
tive security measures. The method developed allows proactive detection 
of weak points in the security architecture and thus reveals potential for 
improvement. 
1. Introduction 
Mobility, particularly air transport, is vital to the economic stability and 
growth of a nation. Air transport symbolizes national self-confidence 
and self-conception, which has made commercial aviation a preferred 
target for attacks by terrorists and other offenders. Airports are part of 
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the critical infrastructure of a country and provide a gateway for the 
majority of terrorist attacks on the air transport system. In the past, 
political and related scientific approaches aiming to cope with airport 
security matters were primarily of a reactive nature [1,2]. New security 
measures have regularly been introduced in a political ad-hoc process as 
a consequence of specific security incidents. The well-coordinated 
terrorist attacks on September 11 are the most prominent examples [3]. 
The liquid ban after the transatlantic aircraft plot in 2006 is another 
example of this costly and often inefficient process of reactive action.  
A good alternative to this reactive procedure would be an anticipatory 
approach, which would allow exploration of the different characteristics 
of potential threats and adaption of appropriate security processes. This 
would not only require an in-depth understanding of the many inter-
linked and complex airport processes, but also a systematic assessment 
of threat aspects or elements, as well as, a related analysis of possible 
and plausible future threats. The methods of futurology might, in prin-
ciple, be applicable in bridging the present gap. The use of the well-
established scenario technique can provide new insights into possible 
future threat situations and, thus, can serve as an important prerequisite 
for any assessment of current and future security measures. 
The typical scenario-building process is, however, insufficient for these 
purposes as it only results in a small number of plausible future scenar-
ios with a rather global focus (see next section). Furthermore, such an 
approach only allows dealing with a relatively small number of elements 
in order to keep the process manageable. This is not appropriate for 
analysing a clearly defined system which has to deal with a large variety 
of possible threats and whose processes are to be improved at a level 
with a high amount of detail. This scope requires an approach for the 
development of a very high number of standardised scenarios which 
show a detailed level of abstraction.  
In this paper, we propose a method which allows generation of the 
required large variety of consistent scenarios and analysis of them in a 
systematic way. A matrix-based method adapted from system analysis 
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and complexity management methods is applied in order to analyse the 
airport security system. The combination of different threat aspects to 
form a valid threat scenario and their link to related security measures 
have been assessed and implemented in a matrix. From such a database, 
structurally consistent scenarios can be produced in a standardised 
form. Analysis of the resulting scenarios enables the user to better 
anticipate possible future threats, identify weak points in the security 
structures and, thus, to proactively improve the respective processes.  
First, the standard scenario approach with its advantages and shortcom-
ings in the context of airport security will be described. Next the en-
hanced approach, which allows inclusion of a high level of detail and 
complexity of the respective system without compromising the manage-
ability for decision makers, will be introduced. This includes system 
capture, scenario building and related analyses. The last section summa-
rises the results and provides an outlook for further research tasks. 
2. The standard scenario approach 
In order to deal with prospective challenges in a proactive way, futurolo-
gy or foresight methods are increasingly gaining acceptance and rele-
vance for companies and politics alike. The scenario process is one of 
the most prevalent techniques in the toolbox of futurological methodol-
ogy.  Chermack and Lynham have defined it as ‘a process of positing 
several informed, plausible, and imagined alternative future environ-
ments in which decisions about the future may be played out for the 
purpose of changing current thinking, improving decision making, 
enhancing human and organization learning, and improving perfor-
mance’ [5]. Scenarios broaden the scope of decision makers by providing 
a range of possible outcomes and insight into the underlying drivers of 
change. Furthermore they uncover already well developed trends or 
predetermined outcomes such as demographic developments and they 
help to avoid biased and lopsided group results by facilitating contrarian 
thinking. Godet described scenarios as useful in a fivefold way, as they 
‘stimulate the imagination, reduce inconsistencies, create a common 
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language, structure collective thought, and enable appropriation by 
decision makers’ [6]. However, scenarios are also prone to misinterpreta-
tion and abuse. Some have described scenarios as counterproductive for 
developing a clear vision and, therefore, not suited for leadership tasks 
[7]. Such a position neglects the fact that a goal can also be robust under 
several different scenarios. Decision makers, however, confronted with 
scenarios when they are actually searching for a one-dimensional vision 
or prognosis often choose one or two scenarios which are closely related 
to their own image of reality. Ignoring the outer scenarios leaves leaders 
exposed to all kinds of dramatic change. The potential of scenarios can, 
therefore, only be exploited if they are correctly understood and applied.  
2.1. The procedure 
In the 1970s, scenarios entered the field of strategic planning both in 
public and private sectors, with the methodologies developed and made 
popular by consultancy groups such as Battelle [8]. The Battelle approach 
(e.g. [9]) is structured in eight steps, where a problem specification (1) is 
followed by environmental screening (2), which then requires a specifi-
cation of the relevant parameters and characteristics (3). This is followed 
by a clustering of assumptions (4), an interpretation of selected scenari-
os (5), an analysis of wild cards (6) and implications (7), which then 
leads to concrete action planning (8). Thirty years later de Jouvenel [10] 
provided a comprehensive review of scenario methods and described the 
prospective procedure in a similar way but condensed it to five basic 
steps: defining the problem and choosing the horizon (1); constructing 
the system and identifying key variables (2); gathering data and drafting 
of hypotheses (3); exploring possible futures, often with the help of tree 
structures (4); and outlining strategic choices (5). In the following, these 
steps will be referred to as the standard scenario process. The system 
analysis (in steps 2 and 3) also includes an assessment of the interrela-
tions within the system, which is generally implemented by a cross-
impact analysis [11]. Apart from similarities in the different standard 
processes described above, it is obvious that every scenario generation 
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process varies with the specific topical context, the experience and the 
tools of the respective moderator.  
2.2. Characteristics of standard scenario problems 
Before starting the scenario generation process, the following question 
has to be asked in order to choose the appropriate methodological steps: 
To what purposes are scenarios generally well-suited and what are the 
relevant features in the respective system or topical context? In cases of 
large uncertainty and, thus, numerous and quite different possibilities 
for future developments in the respective environment, scenarios cannot 
be built reliably at any level of detail. However, even if this is not the 
case, it is problematic to structure “the unknown”. A reasonable and 
helpful way to approach this problem is to identify and describe the 
scenarios by means of a small number of decisive variables. Scenarios 
can, thus, be characterized by the two most important driving forces, 
resulting in an illustration of scenario-axes with the four quadrants 
representing four related scenarios [12]. Such a structure, which allows 
the making of seemingly unrelated data operationally useful, proved to 
be quite valuable in environments where a few decisive variables charac-
terise an economic sector or certain political developments sufficiently. 
However, even for issues where many variables are needed to describe 
the environment, the number of resulting scenarios rarely exceeds four. 
This is mainly for simplicity reasons in order to avoid overwhelming the 
decision maker [10]. 
2.3. Morphological analysis and scenario building 
One approach to deal with more detail and a larger variety of scenarios 
has been introduced with the Morphological Analysis (MA). It was 
originally developed by Fritz Zwicky (1898–1974) in the mid 1960s in 
course of his work for the California Institute of Technology [13] and 
rests on a matrix based representation of the considered system. The 
basic methodology has been improved in recent decades, mainly 
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through computer-supported implementations, and has been successful-
ly used for scenario development [14]. In the context of security issues, 
this approach allows us to decompose potential threats into key compo-
nents [15]. These can then be more closely examined in order to identify 
the combinatorial rules between these components. This allows explor-
ing of the event space in search of specific threat scenarios or related 
scenario clusters that may reveal vulnerabilities and, therefore, become 
of special interest. In order to attain scenarios, it is necessary to identify 
consistent configurations of the relevant system components. This is 
achieved by a pair wise comparison within a cross-consistency matrix 
[14], which allows to eliminate inconsistent configurations or scenarios. 
In order to assess available airport security measures with respect to 
relevant threat scenarios, the matrix based system representation needs 
to include many airport related components as well as threat elements. 
This results in a very high number of relevant elements. A pair wise 
comparison, as conducted in the MA approach described above, is very 
difficult, because of the extremely high amount of theoretically possible 
configurations.  Therefore, our approach goes beyond a standard MA-
based scenario procedure and draws on methods from the field of 
product development capable of dealing with high structural system 
complexity. We introduced an additional matrix on a higher level of 
abstraction, the so-called “Multiple Domain Matrix”, which allows 
handling the large number of elements as well as the corresponding 
system complexity. The resulting enhanced scenario process is described 
in Section 3. 
3. The enhanced structural complexity scenario approach 
In the context of airport security it is neither sufficient to use a small 
number of descriptive variables, nor is a small number of scenarios 
adequate to cover the possible varieties of future threats. Here a clearly 
defined complex security system (characterized by a variety of utilized 
processes, technologies and involved actors) has to deal with a large 
variety of threat aspects and, therefore, many variables or critical uncer-
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tainties. An approach to dealing with airport security in a proactive way 
would, therefore, require a process which includes the advantages of 
scenario planning without compromising the specific requirements of 
the airport security system. Such requirements include the development 
of numerous standardised scenarios which still offer a high level of 
abstraction. This is necessary as scenarios – in this context – serve to 
identify as many security threats as possible and do not just give an idea 
of the most plausible lines of development. These requirements are not 
in line with the standard scenario approach delineated above. The fol-
lowing sections describe an approach, which allows fulfilment of these 
requirements in a prospective and, therefore, proactive way and thus 
overcomes the shortcomings of standard scenario planning in the 
context of airport security. 
3.1. System coverage, data gathering and structuring 
As mentioned above most scenario processes approach the topic in 
question in a structured way, with clear steps. The procedure may vary 
in detail from one scenario project to another but the basic steps mostly 
stay the same. Moats et al. express it in the following way: ‘Although 
there are numerous variations on how to conduct a scenario planning 
exercise [. . .], all have certain elements in common’ [16]. This section 
will demonstrate how the adaptation of standard scenario methods helps 
to overcome the constraints faced when dealing with large, complex 
systems on a very detailed level. The procedure will be demonstrated by 
drawing on examples from a scenario process conducted at Bauhaus 
Luftfahrt concerning airport security, which was performed by means of 
matrix based methods of structural complexity management, originating 
from product development methodology [17].  
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Fig. 1. MDM on element level. 
The first step of the standard scenario process (see previous section) is 
conducted to define the problem as well as to choose the horizon. Envi-
ronmental scanning can help to detect important influencing factors as 
well as to define the limits of the system in question [18]. In the case 
described in this section, expert discussions as well as literature reviews 
helped to identify potential influencing elements of the airport security 
system. During this process the borders of the system were clearly 
defined or, in de Jouvenel’s words, the horizon was chosen [10].  
Once the system’s borders had been defined, the variables influencing 
airport security were compiled–a procedure corresponding to step two of 
the standard approach. To be able to analyse interdependences within 
the airport security system from an integral point of view, security 
measures as well as elements of threat scenarios were gathered. To 
escape the danger of subjectivity, elements were collected by experts 
from different backgrounds and with different interests in the process. 
Structuring the collected elements was the next step in the scenario 
process conducted. The terms were clustered and structured hierarchi-
cally. In this first version, 210 elements constituted the system on the 
lowest hierarchy level, structured by up to seven hierarchy levels and 
subsumed under 15 top level categories. Nine of these categories refer to 
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threat elements including characteristics of the “potential offender” and 
his possible “intentions”. Furthermore, different types of “tools or 
weapons” are included as well as their respective “application possibili-
ties” (such as remote or manual release). Different ways of “approaching 
the airport”, “inserting the weapon” and the “location of the offender” at 
the time of his attack form three more categories. The “target of the 
attack” as well as “resulting threats” completes the comprehensive 
description of a threat scenario. Two other categories describe counter-
measures for security threats at an airport. “Preventive measures” 
include, on the one hand, processes such as hand-luggage checks and on 
the other hand technologies such as metal detectors, whereas “reactive 
measures” contain mostly processes such as evacuation. Remaining 
categories include other influencing factors in the airport context such as 
“actors” (e.g. different airport users and employees, police, legislation) 
involved, their respective “interests”, and “human factors” affecting the 
quality of security processes.  
Following a standard scenario process, the next step would have been to 
transfer the elements to a matrix to be able to carry out a cross-impact 
analysis of all elements gathered. Transfer of the collected terms to a 
matrix allows the elements to serve as row headings and as column 
headings – both in the same order – resulting in a Multiple Domain 
Matrix (MDM). Diagonal matrix cells thus represent self-reflexive de-
pendences. Since the system shows a very high level of detail this would 
have required specifying 44,100 relations (see Fig. 1).  
Since this is an impossible task with respect to time resources, another 
way had to be found to approach the cross-impact analysis. At this point, 
it was necessary to alter the standard scenario process and adapt the 
approach to the specific requirements of the airport security system. 
Thus, an intermediate step was introduced to reduce the relations to the 
logically necessary connections. This is generally necessary if a system 
consists of too many single elements (and thus element interrelations) 
to be considered within a reasonable timeframe. To gain a more general 
impression of the system, it is vital to change the level of abstraction. Up 
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to this point, the focus has been laid on the element level, the perspec-
tive is now broadened, focussing on the highest level (the “domain 
level”) of the system. On this level of abstraction, which of the domains 
are directly linked to each other can be verified and which of them are 
not connected at all. The latter domain-pairs can later be excluded when 
performing a cross-impact analysis on the element level. This interim 
step significantly reduces the element connection considered to a feasi-
ble number.  
After identifying the domain-linkages, the direction and specific quality 
of each relation was discussed and named. With the help of a flowchart 
these connections were illustrated (see Fig. 2). The arrows in Fig. 2 
represent the direction as well as the quality of a relation between two 
domains (e.g. “potential offender” has “intention”; “tool/weapon” is 
suitable for “target”). 
Fig. 2. Detail of flowchart (showing 9 out of 15 domains). 
After both the quality of the logically necessary interrelations and their 
direction of influence have been specified, domains can be transferred 
back to a matrix design. Fig. 3 shows the result for those domains of 
airport security which are relevant in the context of this paper. Each 
filled matrix cell represents an arrow from the flow chart and, thus, the 
connection of one domain to another. In the matrix cells, each type of 
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connection is specified. Just as in the element matrix (see Fig. 1), the 
domains in the rows influence the domains in the column heading. This 
representation method makes it possible to document the direction as 
well as the specific kind of relation in a very clear way and thus allows 
for an intuitive access to the data. The section of this domain matrix 
presented can be subdivided into two major areas: the red represents the 
elements necessary to form a valid threat scenario and the blue repre-
sents the preventive and reactive (i.e. emergency) countermeasures an 
airport can apply. 
Fig. 3. Detail of MDM on domain level (showing 11 out of 15 domains). 
After the domain’s relations have been reduced to the logically necessary 
ones, the standard scenario process can be picked up again. According to 
de Jouvenel [10] a cross-impact matrix is often employed at this stage to 
analyse the relations between elements. It is typically used as ‘a schema 
for collating and systemizing [...] expert judgments, so as to make it 
possible to construct a conceptual substitute, however imperfect, for a 
wished-for but nonexistent theory of how events affect each one another 
in a multidisciplinary context’ [19]. At this point, the level of abstraction 
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has to be changed back to the lowest hierarchy level of the system, the 
element level. Each matrix cell in the domain level represents a sub-
matrix on the element level. For the following cross-impact analysis, 
only those element relations are considered that belong to a domain 
interrelation that is marked as logically necessary in the domain matrix. 
To ensure a certain level of quality and to overcome the impending 
subjectivity, the determination of the connections has to be carried out 
by a certain number of researchers with different scientific backgrounds. 
Mostly binary decision (indicated by 0 and 1) sufficed to document the 
relationship between two elements. In some cases, a more detailed 
differentiation was necessary and the relation was specified by a 
weighted value (+2, +1, 0,  1,  2), indicating positive or negative influ-
ences. For example, a terrorist could have the intention of causing 
commercial damage, a high loss of human lives and, thus, demoralising 
the population. He could do this by attempting to smuggle explosives or 
a knife through the hand-luggage check. This is the point where the 
airport can render the whole threat scenario harmless. Security 
measures always address single aspects of threat scenarios and never the 
scenario as a whole. By detecting elements of the scenario one hopes to 
render the whole potential threat unsuccessful. If, for example, the 
explosives are detected during the hand-luggage check the whole scenar-
io falls apart because the offender cannot complete the scenario without 
a weapon. 
To cover evolving threats, it is sometimes necessary to adapt the docu-
mented system relations. There are three different possibilities to alter 
the database gathered. First, connections between elements can be 
changed so that elements that were previously not connected are related 
and vice versa. This could become necessary if, for example a known 
weapon was used in an innovative way that had not been anticipated. 
The introduction of new elements is the second possibility to change the 
system which is fairly easy to implement. Hereafter, the new elements 
have to be interlinked carefully according to the logic connection of their 
domains. The third possibility is to integrate a new domain, a step that 
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entails far-reaching adaptations and should only be performed if a new, 
unexpected threat appears, requiring an adaption of system borders. A 
consequence of alterations on the domain level is that the underlying 
logic of the overall system also has to be adjusted to properly integrate 
the new aspects of either threat or security measures. 
These modes of system alteration also allow injecting different levels of 
alleged implausibility into the system. Elements and respective connec-
tions, for example, may be deliberately added or related in a way which 
shows no logical connection from today’s point of view. For example, 
prior to the events of 11th September 2001 an aircraft would not have 
been considered as an effective weapon of mass destruction, but only as 
a target. This procedure, however, serves to stimulate imagination in a 
structured way, thus facilitating the anticipation of different possible 
futures. 
In a standard scenario process, the next step would be to collect data 
concerning the past, present and possible future development of the 
variables considered. As a consequence of the very high level of abstrac-
tion of the airport security system considered, the elements themselves 
are not subject to development. It is their interaction within the system 
that lets the system as a whole evolve. Thus the complexity and high 
detail does not allow approaching the compilation of scenarios with the 
help of plausible projections. Consequently, another way has to be found 
to extract the information gathered during the cross-impact analysis to 
generate consistent scenarios. This process, which is completely beyond 
the scope of the standard scenario process, will be described in the 
following section. 
3.2. The scenario-building-process 
The specified connections in the scenario-part of the matrix (illustrated 
by the red area in Fig. 3) build the base for generating structurally 
consistent and, thus, plausible scenarios. Assuming that the matrix 
comprises all possible threat elements and correct interconnections 
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between them, one could theoretically claim that all possible threat 
scenarios are covered by this approach. All the different shapes a scenar-
io can assume are documented through different combinations of the 
interlinked elements. The elements of a historic or fictive threat scenario 
can, then, be traced within the detailed system matrix (see Fig. 1). Two 
results arise from mapping scenarios on to the documented structure: 
by mapping historic scenarios, the quality of the documented system can 
be scrutinized and by mapping fictive scenarios on to the matrix the 
plausibility of the scenario itself can be validated regarding its structural 
consistency. 
To verify the consistency of fictive scenarios, one has to take a close look 
at the system on the element level and check the interlinkage of the 
different element pairs one by one. Since the system does not only 
consist of threat scenario elements but also includes security measures, 
the relation between the scenario and potentially effective counter-
measures can be traced. Again the connection of each element of the 
threat scenario to each element of the security measures has to be 
assessed. Because of the high structural complexity, it is very time-
consuming to trace each connection. To make the system more easily 
accessible and to overcome these problems, the domains of the system 
were connected via an underlying process logic derived from the parti-
tioning process and connected by the Boolean algebra operators AND 
and OR. This logic was applied to the whole dataset (the single matrix 
elements) in a tool based on MS Excel called “scenario builder”. 
The “scenario builder” helps to compile threat scenarios and offers a 
clear representation of the scenario-specific countermeasures. It allows 
generation of (threat) scenarios by successively choosing consistent 
elements from different domains until a scenario is completed. The 
sequence is based on the underlying logic (starting with the “potential 
offender”, as illustrated in Fig. 2) and every successive choice or step 
only allows choosing from a reduced selection of elements in the next 
domain, according to the logical link from the previous choice. The 
scenario builder, thereby, guides the user through the process of compil-
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ing elements to form a consistent scenario. Besides creating scenarios in 
a very time-efficient way, this approach has the advantage of also produc-
ing scenarios that might seem to make no sense from a rational point of 
view but that are, at the same time, structurally consistent – e.g. scenari-
os a mentally disabled person might pursue.  
After the scenario is compiled, the scenario builder automatically lists 
the security measures that are connected to the elements of the scenario. 
This helps to evaluate the effectiveness of existing security measures 
because the scenario and the related measures are directly opposed. Fig. 
4 depicts the sequence of steps that have been described so far on the 
basis of the standard scenario approach as discussed in Section 2.1. The 
last step “analysis of data set” will be described in the following section. 
Fig. 4. Standard and enhanced scenario process. 
3.3. The system analysis 
The content of the matrix allows analysis of many structural aspects of 
the security system and their relation to specific threat elements. One 
possibility is to analyse the risk coverage by preventive security measures 
but single threat aspects or elements are not the relevant perspective, as 
their combination (or the scenario) creates the valid threat [20]. The 
scenario builder renders the broad space of all structurally consistent 
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scenarios accessible in a rather intuitive way. To gather a certain amount 
of scenarios in order to analyse them, for example, with respect to the 
related security measures, is still a timeconsuming activity. The scenar-
io-building process has been automatised in order to ensure that the 
evaluation of the function of the security measures in relation to differ-
ent scenarios has a broad database. Through the automatic analysis, the 
span of the space of all structurally consistent scenarios can be fully 
exploited. The first analysis of the airport security system, which had to 
run under certain restrictions  in order to match the available calculating 
capacity, resulted in more than 220,000 scenarios. With this large set of 
scenarios, it is possible to analyse structurally weak points in the airport 
security system. For this purpose the scenarios can be sorted according 
to the number of related security measures which potentially address the 
respective threat elements (see Fig 5). 
Fig. 5. Scenarios and potentially effective security measures. 
By clustering similar scenarios, in which in principle only a small num-
ber of countermeasures are able to address the threat (see the ellipse in 
Fig. 5), one can identify threats which are dangerous from a structural 
point of view.  
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Fig. 6 illustrates how the different parts of (standard) threat scenarios 
can be opposed to relevant counter-measures and consequently be 
visualized. This example shows a cluster of similar scenarios, in which a 
suicide bomber tries to smuggle explosives into the security zone of an 
airport to reach a specific target. The columns depict the nine domains 
of the threat scenarios. The numbers in the blue squares represent the 
scenario elements, while the ones in the red boxes indicate the elements 
of preventive counter-measures, which are part of the airport security 
system. When the terrorist tries to conceal the weapon on his body (item 
58), the most relevant counter-measure is the passenger control (item 
111), while concealing in the hand-luggage (item 61) is, amongst others, 
addressed by the hand-luggage check (item 113). Similar analyses can 
identify where redundancies in the system are very large, which might 
indicate a bad cost–benefit performance. 
4. Discussion and outlook 
In the past, new airport security measures have regularly been intro-
duced in political ad-hoc processes, often as a consequence of specific 
security occurrences. A precondition to overcome this reactive procedure 
would be to apply an anticipatory approach. Scenario-planning methods 
could, in principle, be applied to address this problem. However, the 
typical scenario-building process is insufficient for this purpose since a 
large database of plausible scenarios is needed to be able to systematical-
ly improve the airport security system. Thus an approach merging 
elements from a standard scenarioprocess, system analysis and matrix-
based complexity management has been developed and is described in 
this paper. 
This approach allows combination of the advantages of a prospective 
foresight method, which is generally vague in terms of tangible devel-
opments in specific sub-systems, with the accuracy of an in-depth 
system analysis of airport security. Two adaptations of the standard 
scenario process are central: first, the logical reduction of possible links 
between elements for the cross-impact analysis which is necessary to 
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handle large complex systems. The second major extension is the intro-
duction of the “scenario builder”, allowing for a time-efficient analysis of 
the complex data. This kind of extended scenario analysis allows demon-
stration of effects of a specific scenario on other affected stakeholders or 
systems (in this case on airport security). Such an automatised approach 
is valuable when a large variety of scenarios has to be analysed. This, in 
turn, allows a better optimisation of the system concerned because the 
interrelations are documented and, thus, evaluable, for example, with 
respect to structurally weak points in the system. 
Fig. 6. Threat scenario cluster with respective security measures. 
The scenarios analysed still suffered from the restrictions described 
regarding the limited choice of threat elements. This largely reduced the 
resulting number of relevant scenarios which could be analysed. To 
overcome this constraint, it would be necessary to migrate the data to a 
more powerful software environment, such as a database developed to 
suit the specificities of the system. An automated analysis run through 
without the former restrictions would produce an exponentially in-
creased number of logically possible scenarios. Given that millions of 
scenarios cannot be analysed with an appropriate effort, one has to 
define ways of extracting reasonable scenario clusters. These clusters 
could provide a better access to relevant threat categories, as they would 
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combine similar threat characteristics which are treated alike by airport 
security measures. 
For a general overview on the complete airport security analysis of the 
whole “SiVe” project, which includes simulations as well as cost-benefit-
analyses, see Breiing et al. [21]. A more specific description of how the 
scenario builder is interconnected with simulation and risk quantifica-
tion modules and how aggregated risk values are derived is given by 
Maurer et al. [22]. 
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TOWARDS PROACTIVE AIRPORT SECURITY MANAGEMENT: SUP-
PORTING DECISION MAKING THROUGH SYSTEMATIC THREAT 
SCENARIO ASSESSMENT1 
Abstract 
An airport is the gateway which facilitates access to air transport. As a 
reaction to very diverse attacks on the air transport system during the 
last decades a broad range of security measures has been introduced to 
mitigate possible threats. The challenge to provide a trouble free experi-
ence for the passenger and, at the same time, to operate more efficiently 
calls for a proactive approach. This requires the definition of future 
requirements that allow an adaptation of the security system. When 
dealing with uncertainty that future-oriented decisions inevitably display, 
it is important to gain as much knowledge as possible about a system’s 
general structure. The approach described in this paper systematically 
documents elements and relationships of the airport security system. It 
consists of threat scenario elements as well as security measures. The 
development of a software tool, the so-called Scenario Builder, is de-
scribed and its application for the identification of possible future threats 
explained. The presented approach offers intuitive access to the underly-
ing structure of the airport security system. It provides decision makers 
                                                 
1The results presented in this paper are part of the research project SiVe, which was 
partially financed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). 
SiVe was part of the Security Research Program initiated in the context of the High-Tech 
Strategy by the German Federal Government. 
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with a possibility to interact with the system and anticipate effects of 
threat development, thereby enabling robust, future-oriented decisions. 
Keywords: Airport security; Threat scenarios; Complexity management; 
Robust decision making 
1. Introduction 
The airport offers the interface between ground and air transport, func-
tioning as a gate through which passengers, crew and employees must 
pass in order to access air transport. For various reasons, the air 
transport system has been a preferred target for attacks for many dec-
ades (Sweet, 2009), leaving airports “constantly under potential threat […] 
from a variety of sources” (Kirschenbaum et al., 2012a). The airport 
security system in place today is supposed to mitigate potential threats. 
To this end, layer after layer of measures have been introduced, often as 
a direct reaction to specific incidents, creating a very complex socio-
technical system. As threats have constantly evolved in the past and most 
likely will continue to do so in the future, the security system has to be 
improved constantly. Baum (2011) draws the conclusion that with regard 
to aviation security incidents “the best lesson the past has taught us is 
that the next time it will be different”. 
A long term vision for the air transport sector has been recently pub-
lished in the so-called “Flightpath 2050” report by the High-Level Group 
on Aviation Research under the leadership of the European Commission 
(European Union, 2011). In this document, a risk-oriented approach is 
called for to enable future airport security systems to simultaneously 
address relevant threats as well as to operate more efficiently. Decision 
makers will thus have to take possible future developments of the overall 
threat situation into account to proactively adapt the system’s processes 
and technologies. This would imply a radical change of the component-
oriented way airport security is structured today: Currently airport 
security measures mostly address objects that could be used in an attack. 
Accordingly, the walk-through metal detector is implemented to prevent 
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guns or knives from being carried on board and sniffer tests are used to 
detect traces of explosive devices. This approach has been criticised in 
the past. Rather, processes searching for “bad people” instead of “bad 
objects” have been called for (IATA, 2012). But this is not sufficient as by 
themselves neither “bad people” nor “bad objects” pose a threat to 
passengers, airport or aircraft. A valid threat only arises from the combi-
nation of certain core elements, as risk can only be allocated to a threat 
scenario not to single components. For example, a knife itself does not 
pose a threat, but an offender smuggling a knife into the secured area of 
an airport to use it in an attack certainly does. Consequently, a risk-based 
improvement of security measures has to be based on the meaningful 
combination of threat elements.  
Such an approach poses a major challenge for decision makers in the 
field of airport security. Everyday judgements are based on experience 
and best practices. However, in the case of a proactive, future-oriented 
approach there are no precedents. The objective of this paper is to 
present an approach that tackles this challenge by focussing on the 
systematic development of threat scenarios. It is described how possible 
future threat scenarios and their relationship to airport security 
measures can be collected, documented and analysed. To this end, 
elements and structural principles underlying the creation of valid 
scenarios are outlined and their connection to airport security measures 
is described. It is the aim of this paper to demonstrate how the 
knowledge of relationships between threat scenarios and security 
measures gained through the presented method allows decision makers 
to better understand the interaction of system components. The present-
ed approach provides procedure to support proactive and more robust 
decision making in the field of airport security. The approach focuses 
deliberately on documenting objective dependencies and does not take 
the behavioural interactions and informal networks into account that 
security personnel rely in their everyday decision as these aspects have 
been addressed in depth by Kirschenbaum et al. (2012a; 2012b).  
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2. Structure of the Methodological Approach  
In Section 2 a short literature overview dealing with decision making in 
complex situations, modelling of complexity and scenario techniques is 
presented. Furthermore, the underlying components and relationships 
of the airport security system are described. In this section the founda-
tion is laid for a step by step description of the approach (Section 3) and 
the subsequent discussion of the findings in the context of decision 
making processes (Section 4).  
2.1 Literature Review 
Over the past decades the topic of decision making in complex situations 
or systems has attracted wide interest in different research areas. In 
1983 Dörner et al. published their findings from an empirical study 
based on computer-simulated microworlds (see also: Brehmer and 
Dörner, 1993). Developments in computer technology allowed them to 
create dynamic simulation environments, reflecting real-world decision 
problems: complexity, dynamics and opaqueness (Brehmer, 1992). In an 
initially unpublished manuscript from 1973 Luhmann defined discre-
tionary competence as the competence to adequately deal with complexi-
ty (Luhmann, 2009). However, creating robust strategies in a system 
where states of uncertainty and lack of knowledge are constituent (Will-
ke, 2009) is a major challenge for decision makers. An important pre-
requisite for this task is a thorough understanding of the system’s 
structure (Maani and Maharaj, 2004) allowing one to evaluate the effect 
of a decision taken on possible future developments of the system. The 
approach presented in this paper offers the possibility to gain insights 
into future threats and to learn about connections within the airport 
security system.  
The system’s dependencies are modelled mainly following a method 
known as Multiple-Domain Matrix (MDM) (Lindemann et al., 2009; 
Eppinger and Browning, 2012). It is a matrix-based approach for com-
plexity management, supporting a systematic collection of system 
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components as well as their respective dependencies. Different groups 
of elements – structured in so-called domains – are represented in a 
MDM. The method is furthermore designed for analysing system struc-
tures apparent after data acquisition. Characteristics of a complex system 
such as feedback loops or clusters can be visually identified as they form 
typical patterns in the matrix.  
As the original MDM approach has not been developed to deal with 
future developments, insights from the field of scenario planning (Go-
det, 2000; de Jouvenel, 2000; Gordon and Glenn, 2009) have been in-
cluded in the method presented in this paper. A detailed description of 
the steps necessary to integrate aspects of scenario planning with the 
MDM is provided by Cole and Kuhlmann (2012). The combination of 
methods allows benefiting from the knowledge acquisition provided by a 
structured complexity management approach as well as from a future-
oriented perspective of the system addressed. In Section 2.2 basic areas 
that constitute the airport security system as well as the fundamental 
underlying system relationships are described. 
2.2 Towards a Proactive Approach to Airport Security 
The method presented in this paper supports the systematic gathering of 
elements as well as their interrelations relevant for the representation of 
an airport security system. Core areas that need to be considered are 
depicted in Figure 1. “Use Cases” represent the apparent use of the 
airport infrastructure (see Figure 1, box 1) and consist of two different 
subcategories, “Actor” and “Action”. The category “Actor” includes 
elements such as passengers, employees or visitors. “Action” describes 
activities that can be pursued at the airport, for example boarding an 
aircraft, picking up somebody or working. A “Use Case” is thus com-
posed from one element out of each category: e.g. a passenger boarding 
an aircraft or a meeter and greeter picking up friends or relatives. Each 
“Use Case” combination implies certain areas of the airport the actor is 
granted access to. Meeters and greeters, for example, are not allowed to 
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access the secured area of an airport. Thus, the “Use Case” strongly 
influences the range of security measures a person has to undergo. 
The “Use Case” furthermore reduces possible elements for the second 
core area, the threat scenario (see Figure 1, box 2). In this area over 100 
threat scenario elements are subsumed under eight domains such as 
“Potential Offender”, “Tool/Weapon” or “Intention of Offender”. De-
pendencies between scenario elements are documented in a matrix: For 
each relevant combination of two threat elements it is specified whether 
or not they could logically occur in the same scenario. This data base 
allows assembling elements from the different domains that together 
form a valid threat scenario. As described above, the choice of elements 
for the threat scenario is restricted by the predefined “Use Case”: If, for 
example, a potential offender pretends to be a visitor and consequently 
does not possess a valid ticket, it would (in most cases) not make sense 
to choose the aircraft as target of the scenario created. Once a set of 
elements is chosen, a structurally consistent threat scenario is assem-
bled.  
The specifications made in the first two areas predetermine the possible 
paths an attacker can pursue on his way through the airport (see Figure 
1, box 3). In most cases the alternatives are narrowed down to two or 
three options. The clear definition of the path is the last piece of infor-
mation necessary to indicate which security measures need to be taken 
into account in an analysis of the threat scenario outlined by elements 
from the three areas described above. 
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Figure 1: Core areas of threat scenario assessment 
Airport security measures are addressed in the fourth box of Figure 1. 
They are split into security technologies and security activities. The latter 
relates to the processes that somebody might undergo, security technol-
ogies relate to the means by which the process is conducted. Security 
measures are not actively selected by the user, but automatically derived 
once a threat scenario is assembled according to the steps described 
above. Today’s security measures are implemented to reveal certain 
aspects of the threat: They detect or counteract specific elements. The 
relationships between different security measures and threat elements 
are documented in the same matrix as the elements outlining the threat. 
Thus, if elements for a threat scenario are chosen, their interlinkage 
with relevant security measures can be directly derived.  
The logical structure described in this section as well as many different 
components need to be taken into account to get a comprehensive 
impression of the airport security system. In order to handle the large 
number of elements a method has to be employed allowing systematic 
gathering of elements and interrelations, providing means by which the 
data can be analysed and enabling the incorporation of possible future 
developments. The method adapted for these tasks will be described in 
detail in the following section. 
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3. The Scenario Building Process 
The presented approach can be divided into six phases. The first four 
phases constitute the data gathering and scenario building section of the 
approach. The analysis of the generated information takes place in phase 
five and six (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Framework for the developed approach 
3.1 Definition of System Components 
The first step when approaching a new system is to roughly specify 
relevant aspects that need to be incorporated as well as to define the 
system’s borders. It is important to include different experts with an in-
depth knowledge of the discussed subject during this data gathering to 
make sure that no important aspects are being overlooked. The collected 
aspects were regularly contrasted with historical incidents to make sure 
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that all relevant aspects had been included in the data gathering phase. A 
mind map was used to systematically assemble and structure the data. 
Over the course of the project this first set of elements was iteratively 
redefined taking new insights into account. The final version the airport 
security system consisted of 235 elements, subsumed under 15 do-
mains. These include the areas presented in Figure 1 (boxes 1-4). The 
hierarchical tree structure of the mind map supported the depiction of 
the gathered data in two different matrices: The first matrix was built 
from the factors of the main branches of the mind map, so-called do-
mains. These were transferred in the matrix as row as well as column 
headings. The items on the most detailed level, so-called elements, were 
taken as row and column headings for the second matrix. The result of 
this first phase is the specification of necessary system components on 
the domain level (see Figure 2, Building of Model) as well as the popula-
tion of the domains through the gathering of elements (see Figure 2, 
Generation of Information). In this phase the basis for all subsequent 
steps is generated. 
3.2 Development of System Structure 
The second phase aims at defining the mutual dependencies between 
the elements of the airport security system. In a systematic approach all 
possible combinations of elements would need to be considered. This is 
not possible in such a large system as this would have meant to specify 
more than 55.000 dependencies. The MDM approach offers a solution to 
this problem: Instead of directly specifying the element dependencies, 
the focus initially lies on the dependencies between domains. As the 
airport security system consists of 15 domains, this results in a matrix 
with 225 cells representing possible dependencies to be considered, with 
row domains influencing column domains (see Figure 3). In the next 
step logically necessary connections between the domains were speci-
fied. For example, the domains “potential offender” and “intention of 
offender” are connected by the dependency “has” (an offender has a 
certain intention), and the domains “tool/weapon” and “target” are 
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connected through the dependency “suitable for” (a weapon is suitable 
for a specific target). Eventually, only 44 out of the 225 domains needed 
to be connected in this way, representing the system’s logical structure. 
 
Figure 3: Left: Dependencies on domain level (MDM); Right: Dependen-
cies on element level (DSM/DMM)   
Once the dependencies on the MDM level are specified the definition of 
the mutual dependencies on element level can be pursued further. 
However, connections between elements are now only specified if their 
respective domains are logically interlinked. Interdependence between 
two elements is indicated by a “1”, while “0” indicates no linkage. Dur-
ing workshops with different airport security experts the relationship of 
each relevant element pair was discussed and rated. Two different matrix 
areas exist on element level: the Domain Mapping Matrices (DMM) 
specify intra-domain dependencies and the Design Structure Matrices 
(DSM) connect elements within one domain, thus comprising the same 
elements in identical order on both axes (Steward, 1981; Danilovic and 
Browning, 2007).  
This second phase results in the generation of a MDM matrix on do-
main level and the DSM/DMM matrix on element level (see Figure 2, 
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Building of Model). Furthermore, based on these dependencies, differ-
ent system components could be specified and documented (see Figure 
2, Generation of Information). In Figure 2 a box labelled “Constraint 
Modelling” is placed across phases two and three. In phase two this 
indicates the reduction of possible element combinations: elements 
which show no connection (indicated by a “0” in the DMM/DSM) can 
not be part of the same threat scenario.   
3.3 Introduction of Logical Constraints 
In the third phase possible element combinations are narrowed down 
further through the introduction of logical operators and of further 
constraints. A first step towards the generation of valid scenario se-
quences is to define the order in which the scenario elements are speci-
fied (see Figure 2, Generation of Information). This is an important step 
to avoid circular reasoning in the assembly phase of a scenario. For 
example, if element a from domain 1 is specified before element x from 
domain 2 but domain 2 affects domain 1 (e.g. narrowing down the 
possible choice of elements) no definite choice can be made. To avoid 
these feedback loops a method named triangularization can be applied: 
Rows and columns of a MDM are reordered aiming at the grouping of 
all existing dependencies on one side of the diagonal (Browning, 2001). 
If not all filled matrix cells can be moved above the diagonal, this indi-
cates the existence of a feedback loop. The MDM in Figure 3 visualises 
this step: All areas that have to be specified during the scenario building 
process (Use Case, threat scenario and path through airport) are located 
above the diagonal. Cells defining the security measures applied are 
located beneath as they are assumed to counteract components of the 
scenario.   
The MDM approach is limited to the description of the relationship of 
exactly two elements. Maurer has named this limitation the “2-tupel 
constraint” (Maurer et al., 2009). Nevertheless, for the compilation of 
threat scenarios it is sometimes necessary to make sure that more than 
two elements are logically consistent. For example, elements from the 
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following domains have to be consistent to allow a valid threat: “Poten-
tial Offender”, “Tool/Weapon”, “Use of Tool/Weapon”, “Approach of 
Offender” and “Insertion of Tool/Weapon”. These domains have been 
assigned the logical operator AND.  
The last step before a logically consistent sequence of elements can be 
derived takes special cases into account that are not fully covered by the 
data assembled so far. Even after conducting all steps described above, 
some incongruous combinations could still be chosen to form a scenar-
io. Thus, further rules had to be defined complementing the principles 
already documented. The following example gives an impression of the 
complexity of these implemented rules (see Figure 4): A certain security 
technology can only detect a tool/weapon if it (e.g. a knife) is inserted 
into the secured area in a way (e.g. hidden underneath the clothes) that a 
security activity (e.g. body control) employing a certain security technol-
ogy (e.g. walk-through metal detector) can identify the relevant threat 
aspect (e.g. technical capability of metal detector to identify metal objects 
hidden underneath the clothes). 
 
Figure 4: Definition of rules avoiding incongruous element combina-
tions 
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The introduction of logical operators as well as further constraint mech-
anisms (see Figure 2, Building of Model) to be able to generate valid 
sequences of elements (see Figure 2, Generation of Information) was 
the main goal of phase three. With this step, the basic development 
phase of the approach was completed. The following steps focus on the 
generation of threat scenarios and the systematic analysis of related 
security measures.  
3.4 Creation of Scenarios and Clusters 
In phase four elements forming a consistent scenario are finally select-
ed. To that end, a software tool, the Scenario Builder, has been devel-
oped. Because of the vast amount of elements constituting the airport 
security system and the many constraints adding to the complexity, 
assembling a consistent scenario is a very complex task in itself. To 
support this task the Scenario Builder, a software tool drawing on the 
assembled data base, guides the user through the process of element 
assembly, consecutively offering elements from the domains to choose 
from. The order in which the domains are presented follows the se-
quence defined in phase three. After one or more elements are chosen 
from a domain the Scenario Builder moves to the next domain but now 
only offers elements that are consistent with the previously defined 
elements. In this manner one domain after the other is specified until a 
complete, consistent scenario is assembled. The tool allows developing 
scenarios in an intuitive manner, encouraging the user to try out new 
combinations of elements. 
The Scenario Builder can also be used to create scenario clusters. They 
consist of different scenarios that are identical in some aspects and 
differ in others and, thus, represent a certain type of threat but demon-
strate possible variations. They can be created by leaving one or more 
domains unspecified during the process. The builder then automatically 
creates every possible variation. If two to three domains are left unspeci-
fied the resulting scenario cluster can easily comprise 70,000 or more 
scenarios.  
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The result of this fourth phase is the implementation of a tool that 
facilitates the interaction with the data base (see Figure 2, Building of 
Model) as well as the subsequent construction of structurally consistent 
scenarios and scenario clusters (see Figure 2, Generation of Infor-
mation). The actual creation of scenarios is the first step towards the 
application of the developed model (see Figure 2, Application). Whereas 
the amount of gathered information continually grows during the first 
three phases, represented by the broadening boxes (see Figure 2, Gener-
ation of Information), phase four decreases the complexity of infor-
mation to be dealt with in the application phase significantly. This is 
indicated by the tapering shape of the box. 
3.5 Analysis of Scenarios and Clusters 
Once every domain is specified and a scenario is created, the Scenario 
Builder automatically derives the related security measures (activities as 
well as technologies) that counteract or detect specific elements. This is 
represented by phase five in Figure 2 (Application). This step proceeds 
automatically and is the key for the overall approach as the link between 
the threat scenario and related measures finally becomes visible to the 
user.  
 In phase six the scenarios and clusters created during the previous 
phases are analysed (see Figure 2, Application). Because the amount of 
scenarios within a cluster can be rather high, methods for a systematic 
analysis have to be developed. Generally, it is the aim of this phase to 
identify weaknesses in a security system and to derive improvement 
strategies. If a set of scenario clusters is specified, a meta-analysis can be 
conducted, drawing on a range of different types of attacks on the airport 
security system and the measures triggered by them. Such an approach 
allows a more generalized statement on the performance of a security 
system in the light of future threats. A detailed account of strategies to 
analyse the resulting data has been published by Cole and Maurer 
(2011).  
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In the following section the application of the knowledge created in the 
scenario building process for responsible decision makers is discussed 
further. 
4. Application of the Approach in the Context of Decision Making 
Decision making in a complex system comprises all elements of a 
complex situation. They are characterized by manifold interlinked 
variables that develop without interference of an actor. The situation is, 
at least in some areas, intransparent and new to the decision maker. 
Additionally, goals need to be achieved simultaneously and are often 
somewhat vague (Schaub, 1996). Furthermore, the network structure 
leads to cascading effects. A minor mistake in one part of the system can 
lead to a disaster in other parts, spreading along the underlying links 
between variables and system areas (Helbing and Lämmer, 2008). A 
cascading effect potentially leading to a disastrous outcome could be 
triggered, for example, by security personnel not recognizing a knife 
smuggled into the secured area. All of these criteria can be transferred to 
the airport security system described above. Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate 
the interrelatedness of different components of the system.  
The inability to make a decision can be based on insufficient knowledge 
about possible consequences while the fear of potential failures can lead 
to different avoidance strategies. Brehmer identifies two groups of these 
‘pathologies of decision making’ (Brehmer, 1992): The first group 
comprises failures of target specification: ‘Thematic vagabonding’ 
describes a tendency to quickly shift targets without solving the prob-
lems tackled, while ‘encystment’ means to stick to a goal one feels 
comfortable with. The second group includes three different ways of 
refusal to learn from experience: The general refusal to make any deci-
sion is one element in this category. The second pathology is the ten-
dency to blame others for own failures. The latter relates to the delega-
tion of tasks. This includes delegating tasks one should not delegate as 
well as not delegating tasks that should be delegated. Another very basic 
mistake people tend to make when dealing with complex systems is that 
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they “are not interested in finding out the existent trends and develop-
mental tendencies at first, but are interested instead in the ‘status quo’” 
(Dörner, 1980). 
A main reason for the development of the approach described in this 
paper is to enable decision makers to interactively deal with the depend-
encies between possible future threats and airport security measures. 
The scenario builder offers a possibility to develop a broad range of 
scenarios or clusters, to be inspired by the different element choices 
offered for each domain and to experiment with minor or major varia-
tions of scenarios as well as security measures. 
A concrete example for such a variation is presented in the following 
paragraph. The aim of this example is to analyse how changes in the 
placement of security measures affect a specific category of scenarios. A 
rather straightforward scenario cluster could consist, for example, of a 
terrorist trying to attack people in the publicly accessible area of an 
airport by means of guns and grenades (a comparable attack took place 
in 1985 simultaneously in Vienna-Schwechat and Rome-Fiumicino). In 
the current layout such an attack would be addressed by patrol and 
intelligence service. To analyse a different layout, the database feeding 
into the Scenario Builder can be adapted to reflect the relocation of a 
specific security activity. For example, the security activity “body control” 
could be moved from the security checkpoint to the entrance of the 
airport. The screening could be conducted by using a walk-though metal 
detector and regular pat-down searches. This relocation would have a 
large effect on the groups of people having to undergo such a security 
check. In the “old” structure only people holding a valid plane ticket and 
employees working in the secured area of an airport had to undergo 
security checks, in such a “new” system everybody entering the airport 
building (meeters and greeters, people simply shopping at the airport 
etc.) would be screened. Scenarios in which an attacker planned a ram-
page in the public area of an airport would now be addressed by more 
security measures than just patrol and intelligence service. This histori-
cally inspired scenario as well as the rather simple change to the security 
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system have been chosen deliberately as the presented example should 
not allude to possible weaknesses of today’s security system. Of course, 
this procedure can be repeated with a broad range of scenarios or scenar-
io clusters, any component of the security system and different security 
layouts. 
Through the interaction with the Scenario Builder systemic structures of 
the security system can be better understood and the experiential basis – 
a fundamental to decision making – broadened. Effects of decisions 
made today can reach far into the future. If future developments are 
anticipated, actions can be aligned accordingly by letting the future 
become effective in the present (Willke, 2009). This is a very important 
prerequisite for robust decisions and to develop future-proof strategies. 
5. Summary and Conclusion  
In this paper an approach has been described that aims at identifying 
possible future threat scenarios and their relationship to airport security 
measures. To this end, threat elements and components of the security 
system were collected. The elements as well as structural principles 
underlying the system were documented following the Multiple-Domain 
Matrix method, a matrix-based approach to complexity management. It 
was complemented by insights from the field of scenario planning to 
account for future-oriented research questions. The paper outlines the 
various steps that lead from an initial involvement with the airport 
security system, to the development of the so-called scenario builder 
and, finally, to a broad data basis supporting proactive decision making. 
Furthermore, the application of the knowledge gained throughout the 
scenario building process has been discussed. 
In the introduction it was mentioned that the Flightpath 2050 vision of 
the European Commission envisages a risk-based approach to airport 
security to be developed during the next decades. The method presented 
in this paper is a first step in this direction. However, a shortcoming in 
this term is that there is currently no possibility to rank threat scenarios 
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or clusters according to their potential impact on human, financial or 
infrastructural losses. A major challenge for future research will thus be 
to link risk parameters to certain elements of the airport security system 
and to specify probable effects of a broad range of incidents on the 
overall system. This kind of information would provide an even better 
possibility for decision makers to gain insights into the system’s struc-
tural principles and likely consequences of decisions taken. 
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HANDLING COMPLEX SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS: A METHOD FOR 
PROACTIVE OPTIMIZATION OF AIRPORT SECURITY1 
Abstract 
The purpose of security checks at airports is to achieve a reduction in the 
risk of malevolent attacks on the aviation system. The introduction of 
new security measures aims at reducing this perceived level of risk, and 
often takes place as a direct reaction to (attempted) attacks. This proce-
dure means that offenders remain one step ahead of security agents. The 
aim of the approach presented here is to overcome this shortfall by 
supporting decision-making in the context of airport security by a sys-
tematically created knowledge base. The combination of two well-
accepted methods – scenario analysis and structural complexity man-
agement – supports a structured knowledge acquisition process that 
serves as a basis for the proactive identification of system weaknesses. 
Furthermore, this combination of methods can be applied to the search 
for optimisation potentials concerned with possible future threats. The 
basis for the approach is composed of threat scenario components, 
security measures and dependencies between these elements. A Multi-
ple-Domain Matrix is applied for system modelling. Clustering of threat 
                                                 
1 The results presented in this paper are based on research conducted in the course of the 
project SiVe, which was partially financed by the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF). SiVe was part of the Security Research Program initiated in the 
context of the High-Tech Strategy by the German Federal Government. 
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scenarios and intensity of relations to security measures are used for 
analysis. The interpretation of findings makes use of portfolio represen-
tations. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Initial Situation: Aviation as a Preferred Target for Attacks 
The first attacks on aviation security took place in the 1930s and ended 
non-fatal as most of them were hijackings conducted by people seeking 
political asylum [33]. Since then the threat originating from such attacks 
has been constantly evolving. From the 1960s on, civil aviation has been 
an attractive target for terrorists. One of the many reasons is that air-
craft, especially so-called flag carriers, as well as airports are highly 
symbolic targets and physically vulnerable [29]. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
hijacking was the most common threat pattern, predominantly designed 
to make political statements. Between 1970 and 1990, the focus shifted 
to bombings: almost 50 bombs were successfully placed on aircraft 
during this period [7]. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated a completely 
different approach carried out by a group of people equipped with rather 
simple weapons but misusing the aircraft itself as a weapon of mass 
destruction [1]. Since 2001 a widespread exploitation of weaknesses in 
the security chain has taken place (e.g. shoe bombs, underwear bombs, 
printer toner bombs). 
1.2 Problem: Reactive Implementation of Security Measures 
Security measures are invented and implemented for preventing attacks 
on the aviation system. These days attackers have to pass through many 
layers of security technologies and processes in order to reach an aircraft 
and consequently attract maximum attention. The first attempt to coun-
ter these threats took place in 1968 when walk-through metal detectors 
and cabin baggage X-rays were introduced. They were installed as a 
reaction to an incident on an EL AL flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. Ter-
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rorists hijacked the aeroplane and redirected it to Algiers [7]. From this 
event onwards, layer after layer of security technologies and processes 
have been introduced, mostly as direct reactions to security incidents 
[26; 28; 31; 32]. 
A prominent example of the reactive implementation procedure is the 
2001 shoe bombing incident conducted by Richard Reid. He unsuccess-
fully attacked an American Airlines flight on its way from Paris to Miami 
with explosive devices hidden in his shoes, and thus below the height of 
the area scanned by a standard walk-through metal detector. As an 
immediate result, all passengers had to take off their shoes during 
passenger screenings so that these could be X-rayed together with the 
hand luggage. This measure can still be part of the process today.  
The incident described above shows how terrorists have been taking 
advantage of (perceived) weaknesses of the security technologies and 
processes. They plan their attacks intelligently and conduct them, em-
ploying innovative means [4]. Baum draws the conclusion that “the best 
lesson the past has taught us is that the next time it will be different” [1, 
p.1]. The reactive implementation procedure of security measures 
consequently allows the attackers to remain one step ahead of security 
measures. An anticipatory approach is needed to prepare decision 
makers responsible for airport security in the best possible way to not 
only deal with known attacks but also with innovative threats. Therefore, 
a knowledge-based approach is required, which aims at improving 
overall security instead of counteracting single risks. 
1.3 Objective: An Anticipatory System Approach to Airport Security  
The objective of the approach presented here is to provide a basis for 
decision-making in the field of airport security. The relevance, effective-
ness and intensity of these security measures all need to be assessed and 
should serve as a basis for continuous system improvement. Through 
this kind of knowledge security agencies, for example, or airport opera-
tors can be supported in their daily decision-making process. To this 
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end, structural complexity management methods are combined with 
scenario planning methods.  
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, a literature overview 
shows the state of the art in structural complexity management and 
research in scenario analysis. A detailed description of the information 
acquisition process for the approach developed is provided. Subsequent-
ly, the performance analysis of specific measures in relation to single 
threat scenarios or groups of threat scenarios by means of the applica-
tion-impact diagram is introduced. The application of the approach is 
demonstrated in Section 3. Here, results of a particular scenario group 
assessment are shown and interpreted with the help of the application-
impact-diagram. Section 4 summarises the findings and provides an 
outlook on future work. 
2. Methodological Approach 
The following paragraphs present the state of the art in system structure 
modelling and analysis using matrix-based approaches as well as in 
scenario analysis. Thereafter, the methodological approach is described 
in detail. 
2.1 Literature Review and State of the Art 
Optimization of airport security requires an adequate system model 
description. The topic implies that quantified information is hardly 
available. This results from the number of stakeholders involved, split 
responsibilities, reasons for non-disclosure and generally vague infor-
mation about potential attackers, their methods and tools. In this ap-
proach, quantitative modelling is applied, i.e. it is focused on system 
elements, their dependences and the resulting system structure. Conse-
quently, specific characteristics (such as strength, amount), which would 
result in a detailed quantitative model, are not acquired.  
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The objective of the approach described in this paper is the identification 
of threat scenarios consisting of assembled system elements. Further-
more, security measures will be linked to these scenarios. To this end, a 
method known as Multiple-Domain Matrix (MDM) [19; 5] is applied. 
This matrix-based method is designed for systematic acquisition of 
system elements and their mutual dependences as well as for analysis 
and interpretation of the resulting system structures. An MDM inte-
grates different groups of elements (called domains) and is composed of 
Design Structure Matrices (DSM) and Domain Mapping Matrices 
(DMM). 
DSM (as part of the MDM method) was introduced in 1981 [30]. It is a 
square matrix representing elements and links between them. The 
matrix layout allows application of analysis algorithms by the switching 
of matrix rows and columns [18]. The DSM is applied for visual system 
analysis, because system structures such as hierarchies, clusters and 
feedback loops form characteristic constellations. The DMM enhances 
the DSM by linking elements of two domains instead of those of one 
domain only [3]. 
Eppinger and Browning make mention of the fact that an MDM can be 
useful for modelling “system of systems” models [5, p.240]. They note 
that “[a]nalysis techniques for the MDM are still being contemplated and 
developed”. Whereas the sub-matrices can be handled with established 
approaches, one enhancement of the MDM is the possibility to derive 
indirect system dependences [20]. 
Several applications of MDM have been implemented [5]. Hellenbrand 
et al. [11], Koga et al. [14] and Kreimeyer [17] show the identification of 
indirect system links for creation of specific system views. These views 
serve as a basis for analysis and interpretation. Despite these beneficial 
applications, holistic system analysis by MDM has not been documented 
so far. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that an MDM (as well as 
DSM and DMM) only allows modelling dependences between element 
pairs [23]. Attempts to integrate logic operators to matrices (and thus 
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combine more than two elements) have been documented, but they 
hinder conduction of established system analyses [17; 21]. 
MDM is useful for modelling the structure of large systems and repre-
sents a new approach to proactive analysis in the field of aviation securi-
ty. As matrix-based system representations are limited to interdepend-
ence between element pairs only, further development of the method is 
required to enable scenario modelling. Therefore, documentation of 
dependence among numerous elements is necessary (e.g. A and B are 
linked, if C exists). The need for creating scenarios for a proactive ap-
proach to airport security can be explained by the following example: 
Risk is an important evaluation parameter in airport security, but it 
cannot be specified for single threat elements, e.g. a knife. However, the 
combination of certain threat elements, e.g. a knife used by a person 
with a malevolent intention on an aeroplane, can lead to a risk incident. 
Thus, only the combination of system elements (as described in a sce-
nario) can be related to a specific risk.  
The scenario technique is a method applied in future oriented research 
since it facilitates dealing with uncertainty in future developments. A 
scenario offers insights into the underlying drivers of change and pro-
vides a range of possible futures. Godet [8, p.8] highlights the usefulness 
of scenarios as they “stimulate the imagination, reduce inconsistencies, 
create a common language, structure collective thought, and enable 
appropriation by decision makers”. 
The standard scenario process, as described by Jouvenel [13], comprises 
five consecutive phases: First, the problem is defined and system bor-
ders are specified (1). The influencing key variables are then identified 
(2). The gathering of relevant data and an assessment of the interrela-
tions between the system components comprise the next phase (3). A 
cross-impact analysis [9] is generally employed to document the relations 
between the gathered components. Possible futures can be explored 
through valid combinations of system elements (4). The specified sce-
narios can then be used as a basis when outlining strategies to cope with 
possible future developments (5).  
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Some authors have described risk based approaches for critical infra-
structure protection [10] and aviation security policy [26]. Provitolo [27] 
applied Systems Dynamics to analyse risk and catastrophe systems. An 
interesting approach is, furthermore, presented by Jiminez et al. [12]: He 
suggests a proactive risk management based on the weighting of a large 
number of scenarios through a morphological approach followed by an 
in-depth analysis of the implications of the results. Ong et al. [24] have 
demonstrated how possible future failures of aero-engines can be detect-
ed on the basis of knowledge-based analysis and how subsequent aircraft 
downtime can be prevented. 
Drawbacks of the standard scenario approach are, however, the difficulty 
of handling large numbers of key variables due to the resulting vast 
amount of possible valid combinations as well as the limitation of the 
outcome to only a small number of plausible scenarios. However, an 
airport has to stand up to a potentially large variety of threats and its 
system structures have to be analysed in great detail. The approach 
presented in this paper allows us to bridge this gap by combining ideas 
from scenario planning with the MDM methodology and, hence, to 
exploit the advantages of both approaches. 
The application of this combination of methods can provide a high 
number of standardized scenarios which show relations between system 
elements on a very detailed level. The editing and interpretation of 
resulting data, however, as well as an easily accessible depiction pose 
new challenges. This paper proposes a procedure for analysis of data and 
interpretation of depicted of results. It supports decision-makers in 
gaining new insights into aviation security and possible future threat 
situations.  
2.2 Capturing System Components 
The approach presented here consists of three main steps (Figure 1). 
First, system elements and dependences must be captured and trans-
ferred to the model and, therefrom, valid threat scenarios are created 
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(Section 2.2). Secondly, different types of related security measures are 
derived (Section 2.3). In the third main step a diagram is developed for 
analysing and interpreting the usefulness of specific security measures 
against specific threat scenarios.  
Figure 1: Main steps of approach 
2.2.1 Capturing relevant elements and their interdependences  
The first step when approaching a new system is to gather all kinds of 
elements that constitute the system and define its borders. The number 
of elements in the study totals about 200. These elements are split into 
18 domains. The system structure comprises, on the one hand, domains 
that form a threat scenario such as “potential offender” or 
“tool/weapon”. On the other hand, the system structure comprises 
domains that represent the airport security measures (”security activity” 
and “security technology”) as well as the airport layout (e.g. “departure 
zone”). An MDM was set up with the domains serving as row and as 
column headings to determine the interrelation of these parts. The 
different types of relations were then specified (Figure 2). Cells that are 
blank indicate that the domains are independent of each other in the 
presented system view2. 
  
                                                 
2
 See also [2] for a description of the procedure from a scenario planning perspective. 
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Figure 2: Multiple-Domain Matrix comprising domains and their respec-
tive relations (adapted from [22]) 
When the domains of the airport security system and their general 
relations have been defined, the focus is placed on the element level in 
the next phase. Each domain consists of several elements. If their re-
spective domains are interlinked, some elements in this sub-matrix will 
possess dependences. The domain “tool/weapon” includes, for example, 
the element “improvised explosive devices” and the domain “threat” the 
element “hijacking of aeroplane”. These two domains are linked by the 
relation “allows”. Some tools or weapons will allow hijacking of an 
airplane. The dependences between system elements were acquired 
from experts in workshops. All relevant relations on the element level 
were specified either by “1” (existing relation) or by “0” (no relation). 
This procedure systematically evaluates the dependences between 
system elements that could either be part of the same threat scenario or, 
in the case of airport security elements, could impede the threat. 
2.2.2 Compilation of valid threat scenarios and scenario clusters 
Two necessary conditions have to be met to form a valid scenario: At 
least one element from each threat-related domain has to be chosen and 
these elements must be consistent according to the expert knowledge 
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documented in the MDM. This extraction of scenarios is not supported 
by conventional MDM approaches, as only dependences between pairs 
of system elements can be modelled in such matrices. To facilitate the 
scenario-building process, a software tool has been developed that uses 
the MDM as input and guides the user through the scenario-building 
process. This “Scenario Builder” presents to the user elements from one 
domain after another to choose from. To this end, logic operators have 
been defined as connectors between the subsets of the MDM. The 
Scenario Builder then only lists elements that are consistent with the 
already chosen scenario parts to make sure that only matching elements 
are selected. The sequence in which the elements are offered was care-
fully deduced from the matrix structure to avoid circular reasoning [21]. 
The process of scenario building can be automatised: If only a few 
domains are specified by the user, the Scenario Builder generates all 
scenarios that can be formed on the basis of the preselection. According-
ly, the resulting so-called scenario clusters comprise only scenarios that 
show certain ex ante defined qualities. The fewer the elements that are 
specified beforehand the bigger the cluster. For example, if one would 
only specify the domains “potential offender” (e.g. terrorist), “tool/ 
weapon” (e.g. improvised explosive device) and the “threat” (e.g. hijack-
ing of aeroplane) the Scenario Builder would automatically search for all 
possible combinations of scenario elements consistent with that choice. 
If the automatised scenario-building process is run through with no 
preselected elements, all structurally consistent scenarios are produced 
purely through permutation. The Scenario Builder, thus, provides an 
interface through which one can access the stored knowledge [15] with-
out oversimplifying the complex structure of the airport security system 
[25]. 
2.3 Threat-Related Assessment of Security Measures 
After a threat scenario is computed, the Scenario Builder automatically 
lists all related security measures (security activities and technologies). 
This information is taken from the MDM, where the impact of security 
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measures on threat elements is modelled. There are two different types 
of security measures deduced in two different ways: pass-through 
measures and potentially effective measures. 
The first two domains that influence the pass-through measures are 
“actor” and “use”. They indicate what kind of disguise a potential of-
fender displays: whether somebody pretends to be a meeter and greeter 
or to go on a long distance flight, fundamentally affects what kind of 
security activities he will have to face at the airport and which areas he is 
subsequently granted access to (arrow labelled “case-related” in Figure 3, 
part A). The scenario-specific measures are further narrowed down by 
the path the potential offender pursues through the airport. Different 
security activities are conducted either within particular areas of the 
airport (e.g. patrols in the publicly accessible area) or at the transition 
from one area to another (e.g. hand luggage checks on the border from 
the publicly accessible area to the departure area). The three domains 
“departure zone”, “end zone” and “attack zone” describe the different 
areas an offender passes through in order to reach his final position 
(arrow labelled “path-related” in Figure 3, part A).  
Figure 3: Two means of deducing scenario-oriented security activities 
and technologies 
Which security activities have to be conducted at what point in the 
airport is specified by the regulator (e.g. Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 
[6]). However, which security technologies are used to fulfil the required 
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activities can differ between airports. For example, the follow-up check 
after the metal detector produced an alarm can either be conducted by 
means of a hand-held metal detector, a pat-down search or both. Thus, 
the security technologies which could be applied during the security 
activities must be specified (arrow labelled “activity-related” in Figure 3, 
part A). Finally, users assemble structurally consistent scenarios or 
scenario clusters and automatically derive related security measures with 
which an offender is confronted on his particular way through the 
airport. 
Potentially effective security activities relate to the specific threat scenar-
io based on the tool or weapon employed in a scenario and the way it is 
transported and possibly inserted into secured areas of the airport. 
Certain security activities can counteract specific ways of inserting a tool 
or weapon. For example, the fact that passengers have to pass through 
body control in the course of passenger screening is supposed to impede 
the insertion of a weapon hidden on the body into the secured area. 
Thus, security activities can at least complicate different ways of insert-
ing a tool or weapon (arrow linking “insertion of tool/weapon” and 
“security activity” in Figure 3, part B). 
The theoretical detection capability of a security technology does not 
depend on whether or not it is employed in a security activity conducted 
in the specific scenario (cluster). Security technologies have varying 
capabilities, e.g. a walk-through metal detector exclusively detects metal, 
whereas new-generation body scanners recognise different kinds of 
objects on the skin surface. Nevertheless, they could replace one another 
in the same security activity. If an explosives belt without a metal fuse is 
hidden underneath the clothing, a metal detector would not set off an 
alarm but the chances are that a body scanner would. This relation is 
displayed by the arrow linking “tool/weapon” and “security technology” 
in Figure 3, part B. 
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2.4 The Application-Impact-Diagram 
Security activities and technologies that are applied in response to a 
specific scenario (cluster) do not necessarily address the relevant threat 
elements. Furthermore, security activities and technologies that have the 
potential to render the specific threat harmless are not necessarily 
applied. To make this relation more transparent the application-impact-
diagram (Figure 4) was developed, setting these two aspects into rela-
tion. The description of extreme cases below lists the implications that 
can be drawn from the diagram: 
 Position in the lower left corner of the diagram: Security meas-
ure is not applied and not effective, it is not relevant for the sce-
nario cluster considered. 
 Position in the upper left corner of the diagram: Security meas-
ure is applied but not effective, the application of the measure 
wastes resources (of airport security staff as well as passengers) 
in the context of the specific cluster; further technical develop-
ment of the measure could improve the effectiveness, the posi-
tion of the security measure would then move to the right. 
 Position in the lower right corner of the diagram: Security 
measure is not applied but would be effective, e.g. for reasons of 
high procurement costs a measure is not applied. Investment 
could improve the impact against considered threat scenarios, 
the position of the security measure would then move upwards 
in the diagram. 
 Position in the upper right corner of the diagram: Security 
measure is at the same time applied and effective. 
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Figure 4: Application-impact-diagram  
The highest efficiency regarding a particular scenario (cluster) can be 
reached if the frequency of application and the frequency of impact are 
equal. Thus, efficient security measures are located along the diagonal of 
the diagram. However, it has to be taken into account that both axes 
represent statistical values. Possible consequences are explained by the 
following example: If a security measure is effective in 10,000 threat 
scenarios and also is applied in 10,000 scenarios, it would be located on 
the diagonal of the diagram. However, if the scenario cluster consists of 
20,000 scenarios in total, it is possible that the security measure is only 
applied against scenarios where it is not effective. This would mean no 
efficiency at all. Thus, the congruence between application and impact of 
a security measure must be known in order to rate the efficiency. To this 
end, one can take a set of random samples (statistical evaluation) or 
narrow down the scenario cluster. An adequate size of a scenario cluster 
is reached, if the impact of a security measure can be estimated as being 
identical for the entire cluster. For example, using a knife in the security 
area that was hidden underneath the clothing to bypass screening, forms 
a scenario cluster which is entirely impacted by pat-down search. 
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Changing impact or application of security measures results in their 
relocation in the diagram. Movements to the right indicate technical 
improvement by product development as more scenarios are addressed. 
Consequently, movements to the left do not normally appear, as this 
would mean a degradation of impact against scenarios. Vertical move-
ment implies investment changes as the security mechanism is applied 
to more (or fewer) scenarios. 
Figure 4 contains a grey shaded area at the left. Security measures 
located within this far left area lack a certain technical maturity or they 
are not well suited for the specific cluster because they only impact a 
very small number of scenarios within the cluster. Technical improve-
ment could probably move the security measures out of this area. 
2.5 Practical Application of the Approach 
The following paragraphs show how, for example, security regulators, 
airport operators or security agencies could apply the approach benefi-
cially. For instance, if a certain type of attack has occurred lately, using 
specific ways to disguise explosives, security agencies would probably 
assume a higher risk of similar attempts, since the modus operandi of 
attacks is often imitated. The following aspects can be highly relevant for 
decision-makers developing adequate actions: 
 How many specific threat scenarios exist based on the use of 
the specific type of weapon? That means: How many valid sce-
narios does the scenario cluster contain? 
 How well do the security measures protect the airport from 
threats posed by the scenario cluster considered? That means: 
Which security measures would theoretically address relevant 
threat elements and which are the ones applied (to which de-
gree) against the scenario cluster considered? 
 Which security measures should be improved and how? That 
means: Which security measures show the highest potential for 
 106 
 
improvement and should they be applied more often or should 
their effectiveness be improved? 
In section 3 these aspects will be discussed in more detail drawing on an 
example of a scenario cluster and the related application-impact-
diagram. 
3. Application Example “Flying Aircraft” 
Each scenario cluster is specified by a preselection of certain scenario 
elements. Table I shows an extract of the elements specified for the 
scenario cluster “Flying Aircraft”. Due to the need of non-disclosure 
some elements are hidden. Elements have been specified in four do-
mains. Elements within the same domain (e.g. in the domain “actor”) 
can be included alternatively in the scenarios (as has been done for two 
of the four domains). A valid scenario is composed if at least one ele-
ment from each domain has been specified. The more elements are 
specified, the smaller the number of scenarios within the cluster.  
Table 1: Specification of the scenario cluster “Flying Aircraft” 
Domain Specified scenario element
passenger - standard-passenger
passenger - VIP-passenger
passenger - trusted traveler
employee - airline - crew
…
potential offender politically motivated (terrorist)
explosives
stabbing weapon
target aircraft - in the air
Flying Aircraft
actor
tool/weapon
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The cluster “Flying Aircraft” consists of scenarios that are all conducted 
by a terrorist, who tries to attack an aircraft in the air using explosives 
and a stabbing weapon.  
3.1 Application-Impact Diagram for “Flying Aircraft” 
The application-impact-diagram for the scenario cluster “Flying Aircraft” 
is shown in Figure 5. The legend lists some of the security measures 
considered such as “hand luggage control” or “check-in”. In total the 
cluster contains 97,416 scenarios based on the specification listed in 
Table I.  
Figure 5: Application-impact-diagram for the scenario cluster “Flying 
Aircraft” 
The positions of security measures in the diagram can be classified into 
three groups: Five measures (cargo control, control of delivery, baggage 
reconciliation, access control, cyber-attack defence) are located close to 
the zero point of the diagram (indicated by “A” in Figure 5). These 
measures do not address threat elements in this specific cluster and are 
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also not applied. They are not designed for application in this scenario 
cluster and, therefore, do not need to be considered any further. Howev-
er, it should be mentioned that these measures could be in more promi-
nent positions if another cluster were to be considered (e.g. containing 
cargo or cyber threat elements). 
Five security measures (baggage control, check-in, identity control, 
boarding pass control, anti-return system) are located close to the vertical 
axis (indicated by “B” in Figure 5). These measures are applied against 
scenarios of the cluster and, thus, require resources. But they only show 
very little impact. Of course, this statement only holds true with regard 
to the scenarios considered of the cluster considered. Regarding other 
scenarios, these measures could possess a high impact and contribute 
crucially to the overall security level, for example, if someone tried to 
access the aircraft without a valid ticket. 
Two security measures (profiling, patrol) are located in the upper right 
corner of the diagram (indicated by “C” in Figure 5), which means they 
are applied to, and at the same time prove to be effective, against the 
scenarios in the cluster. Here, profiling and patrol are passed-through in 
all scenarios of the cluster and are potentially effective in almost 90% of 
the scenarios. Consequently, application and impact of measures must 
usually occur in the same scenarios and more detailed analyses of the 
scenario cluster (e.g. consideration of random samples) are not required. 
If a security measure were passed-through only in 60% of the scenarios 
within one cluster and the same measure were potentially effective in 
only 50%, it would be necessary to analyse whether application and 
effectiveness concern the same scenarios.  
In Figure 5, body control and hand luggage control cannot be assigned 
to any of the before- mentioned areas. These measures must be passed-
through in more than 90% of the scenarios in the cluster but are only 
potentially effective in 30% (indicated by “D” in Figure 5). 
As explained in Section 2.5, the distance between the location of a 
security measure in the diagram and the diagonal is an indicator of the 
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efficiency of this measure. If currently located above the diagonal, the 
efficiency of a measure would improve if more scenarios of the cluster 
were impacted. Typically, this would require further (technical) devel-
opment of the measure. If located below the diagonal, the efficiency of a 
measure could be improved by its being applied to more scenarios. 
Typically, this means increasing the investment in application. In Figure 
5, body control and hand luggage control are located above the diagonal 
and, thus, show a potential for technological and/or process-related 
improvement. 
4. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, an approach towards a proactive identification of weak 
areas within the airport security system is presented which is based on 
methods drawn from structural complexity management and scenario 
planning. The model of airport security by MDM allows interaction with 
an extremely large number of possible threat scenarios. The concept of 
scenario clusters allows focussing on classes of similar threats, which 
can be analysed effectively and help answer the specific questions of 
security agents. The approach presented can support responsible deci-
sion-makers by providing insights into the relations within the socio-
technical security system. The approach thus supports the preparation of 
the airport security against innovative threats and means a break with 
the sole implementation of reactive security measures.  
The application-impact diagram has been introduced to visualize the 
derived potential for improvement of the overall security level. This 
diagram provides a simple visual link between a threat scenario cluster 
and security measures. The position of security measures in the diagram 
supports decision-making with regard to specific threats. 
Future work will be based on the ongoing collection of different scenario 
clusters. These clusters can then be analyzed one by one and later 
merged to produce one large data base. The larger the variety of different 
clusters, the greater is the amount of multi-faceted information con-
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tained in the data base. Subsequently, this data base will allow the 
identification of structural weaknesses in the complex system of aviation 
security. This knowledge can support decision-makers in the identifica-
tion of areas for proactive improvement and, thus, in improved handling 
of threats to this complex socio-technical system. 
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AIRPORT SECURITY SYSTEM 
Problem Statement 
Civil aviation faces a constant threat from terrorist attacks. The airport 
functions as a gateway, and installed security checkpoints are meant to 
reduce the occurrence of attacks. Being able to cope in an efficient way 
with both potential threats and increasing passenger volume is a highly 
demanding challenge. To prepare the airport for future threats, one 
needs to take a systems view in order to thoroughly understand the 
elements of possible future threat scenarios as well as their interrelation 
with existing security measures. 
Data Collection 
Bauhaus Luftfahrt is an international think tank founded by the Bavari-
an Ministry for Economic Affairs and three aerospace companies, EADS, 
Liebherr-Aerospace and MTU. Together with Teseon, a software devel-
opment and consulting company, Bauhaus Luftfahrt constructed an 
airport security system MDM model containing approximately 300 
elements grouped into 15 domains. Within this system there are approx-
imately 11,000 possible relations, of which more than 3,200 direct 
dependencies were specified. At first, we identified the relevant elements 
in brainstorming sessions with up to six experts and a moderator. The 
identified elements were directly depicted in a mind map and then 
classified in a hierarchical tree structure. Elements describing the main 
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branches of this structure served as the 15 domains for the MDM model, 
structured as shown in figure 9.9.1. 
Figure 9.9.1 Layout of the MDM for describing valid threat scenarios 
 
The 15 domains in the square MDM resulted in 225 submatrices de-
scribing general dependencies within and between the domains. In a 
subsequent step, relevant submatrices with direct dependencies were 
identified and characterized. For example, the domain tool/weapon is 
linked directly to the domain use of tool/weapon (by the relation allows) 
but not to the domain intention of offender. It turned out that less than 
20% of the submatrices were directly dependent and consequently 
utilized for the system modeling.  
Finally, we transferred the system elements from the mind map to the 
MDM as row and column elements in their respective domains. In a 
series of workshops, the element dependencies indicated by the direct 
interrelation of the respective domains were specified. See figure 9.9.2 
for an example DMM. 
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Figure 9.9.2 DMM showing direct dependencies between the intention 
of offender and target domains 
 
Model 
The identified domains can be aligned by triangularization, resulting in 
a clear sequence for the composition of valid threat scenarios, as illus-
trated in Figure 9.9.3. Starting the scenario-building process, the first 
two domains indicate a person’s apparent use of the airport infrastruc-
ture. Whether somebody goes shopping or on an international flight 
affects which kind of security measures he might be confronted with 
and which areas of the airport he might have access to. This definition 
already narrows down the element choice for the subsequent scenario 
generation (figure 9.9.3, group 1). For example, somebody shopping at 
the airport will not be able to reach the target, aircraft - on ground, as he 
will not be granted access to secure areas.  
After the elements of the first two domains are specified, the threat 
scenario can be assembled. The composition of a valid scenario without 
any circular logic in the building process can be assured by choosing the 
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elements according to the sequence indicated by the MDM. Group 2 in 
figure 9.9.3 contains the relevant domains for this. Each selection affects 
the elements in the following domains; they are reduced to the ones 
consistent with the chosen scenario. When at least one element of each 
domain is settled (multi-selection of some elements is possible, such as 
in the tool/weapon domain), a structurally consistent scenario is com-
pleted. In addition to the scenario, it is important to know the attacker’s 
way through the airport. Based on this information, scenario-specific 
security measures can be deduced. Possibilities are greatly reduced by 
specifying the use case (group 1). Additional choices have to be made in 
group 3 (the dependencies between threat scenarios and the airport 
layout). 
Figure 9.9.3 MDM structured into groups of DSMs and/or DMMs 
 
The remaining areas of the MDM contain security measures addressing 
single elements of the scenario (group 4) and information about the 
specific airport’s security infrastructure (group 5). The information from 
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these two parts of the MDM is needed to evaluate the airport’s capacities 
to address the threat. 
Results 
An important result was a well-documented structure of the system and 
the interrelations of its elements – already achieved during the data 
acquisition phase. This clarified the definitions shared by all the partici-
pants.  
Systematic data acquisition provided the basis for a structured assess-
ment of threat scenarios. The system of airport security was too large for 
reasonably tracking the connection of each desired pair of scenario 
elements in the matrix, given the required level of detail. For this reason 
we developed a tool for facilitating the data access. A scenario builder 
draws on the data gathered in the MDM and guides the user through the 
process of building a plausible scenario. It provides the sequence in 
which the elements need to be specified: Elements can only be chosen if 
they are consistent with the pre-specified aspects of the scenario. Thus, it 
is impossible to assemble structurally inconsistent scenarios when 
working with the builder. Furthermore, after completing a scenario, the 
builder automatically indicates which security activities and technologies 
address elements of the respective scenario. The tool offers intuitive 
interaction with the complex structure, making the broad space of all 
structurally consistent scenarios accessible.  
In planning airport checkpoints while taking possible future threats into 
account, it is desirable to account for as many scenarios as possible. As 
the manual creation of scenarios is time-consuming, the scenario build-
er has been automated, permuting through all possible element combi-
nations and consequently producing all of the structural possibilities in 
the scenario design space.  
Analyzing these data gave us hints concerning weak spots in the existing 
structure: Scenario clusters with few security technologies and activities 
addressing them might not be well protected. However, scenarios ad-
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dressed by a large number of security measures might hint at possible 
redundancies in the airport layout. Such an analysis serves as a basis 
when testing the implementation of alternative techniques and layouts: 
If a poorly protected scenario cluster is addressed by new processes or 
technologies, then new measures seem appropriate. 
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8. Discussion and Future Work 
The central aim of this thesis was to present an alternative to the reactive 
approach to airport security that is predominant today. The approach 
was motivated by developments in the field of decision making suggest-
ing that expertise and knowledge-acquisition are fundamental precondi-
tions for proficient decision making in complex environments. The 
constant need to adapt the security system has been related to the notion 
that the perceived threat to airport security is continuously evolving, 
based on the fact that attackers demonstrate a high level of creativity. 
Following an overview of the concepts, models and approaches referred 
to throughout this dissertation, possible directions of future work will 
then be outlined. 
In Section 2, requirements for decision making in the context of airport 
security were specified. A figure was provided visualising these re-
quirements as well as elements supporting the decision and possible 
actions based on the decision. It was argued that in order to understand 
underlying concepts such as knowledge acquisition and creativity one 
has to turn to research in the field of psychology. Section 3 dealt with 
decision making in complex environments. A short overview of the 
historical development of decision making within the context of psy-
chology was provided before turning to current concepts. Naturalistic 
Decision Making and Fast and Frugal Heuristics were presented in 
more detail. A common characteristic of the two approaches is that they 
both build upon the notion that a decision can only be understood in the 
context of the environment in which it is made. Because Naturalistic 
Decision Making studies concentrate on decisions made in real-world 
settings by experienced decision makers, it was identified as being 
highly relevant in the context of airport security. The development of this 
line of research and related research models were described. Within the 
Naturalistic Decision Making framework, anticipatory thinking was 
introduced as a prerequisite to forestall and prevent possible future 
threats. The relevance of learning, knowledge-acquisition and expertise, 
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not only for future-oriented decision making, is apparent throughout the 
whole section. 
Closely interlinked with anticipatory thinking, creativity was recognized 
as a concept highly relevant in the context of proactive airport security 
management. The fundamental background of creativity as a concept 
within psychological research was presented and a number of different 
approaches introduced. Confluence approaches were identified as 
matching the understanding of creativity within the field of airport 
security. The basic assumptions of two such approaches – Investment 
Theory of Creativity and Systems Theory of Creativity – were presented. 
A special emphasis was put on the relation between creativity and 
knowledge. Two opposing views on the role of knowledge in the context 
of creativity research were presented, namely the Tension View and the 
Foundation View.  
In the following section, insights from decision making research as well 
as research on creativity were related to aspects of airport security. The 
airport was described as a gateway through which access to the air 
transport system is granted. To prevent attackers from harming this 
system, security measures have been introduced, mostly in the after-
math of incidents. It was argued that airport security fulfils the criteria 
for a complex system, as it consists of a large number of varying and 
interrelated elements. Acquisition of extensive knowledge about such 
complex structures was described as being highly relevant in the context 
of decision making. However, feedback-loops, a basic requirement for 
learning, are generally missing in this decision environment because 
attacks on the airport security system occur very seldom. Thus, the 
effects of preventive actions taken can hardly ever be tested in the real-
world setting. To compensate for this deficiency, a software tool, called 
Scenario-Builder, was introduced. This tool allows the user to construct 
threat scenarios and clusters and, once a scenario is completed, automat-
ically lists security measures that are relevant to the specific choice. 
Furthermore, the tool offers a possibility to rearrange security measures 
within the airport context. In the next step, the effects of these virtual 
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changes can be analysed and interpreted. It was suggested that the tool 
can (partially) substitute real-world experience and that a better under-
standing of the security system, effects of future threats as well as possi-
ble adaptations can be achieved. 
Subsequently, how airport security and creativity relate to each other was 
traced. To this end, the evolution of the threat to the air transport system 
over the last decades was illustrated. The conclusion was drawn that the 
innovative potential inherent in each new attack presents a continuous 
challenge constituent to airport security. A dynamic interplay between 
the introduction of counter-measures and the exploitation of newly 
identified weaknesses was described. It was concluded that malevolent 
organisations need to be outpaced to effectively guard the transport 
system. The Scenario Builder was presented as a tool able to support the 
creative process of envisaging possible new threats by encouraging the 
user to reflect effects of different element choices throughout the pro-
cess of scenario generation. 
In conclusion of this section the methodologies underlying the devel-
oped approach, namely Multiple Domain Matrices and Scenario Tech-
nology, were introduced and shortcomings of both methodologies 
highlighted. It was argued, that through the combination of both ap-
proaches main drawbacks can be overcome. 
The major part of the thesis was focussed on four publications, three 
journal papers and one book chapter. The strong interdisciplinary focus 
of the approach is reflected by the different scientific backgrounds of the 
journals and the book. Each publication was introduced, and the differ-
ent perspectives they offered on proactive airport security management 
were highlighted. The first paper employs the viewpoint of a scenario 
process and describes ways to enhance the standard process to be able to 
deal with large, complex systems. Paper number two deals with the 
airport security system from the perspective of matrix-based complexity 
management. A framework is presented that structures the relevant 
phases of the approach. Furthermore, methodological innovations 
necessary to reflect the complex structure of the airport security system 
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are highlighted. The main focus of the third publication is placed on the 
analysis of the large data base that results from the scenario building 
process. A detailed example is presented, demonstrating possible ways 
of accessing and interpreting the generated data. Finally, the fourth 
publication traces the visual structure of the airport security system in 
the matrix representation of the airport security system. 
In summary, it can be stated that this dissertation contributes to the 
fields of psychology, air transport and system engineering. Regarding 
the discipline of psychology, the main contribution relates to decision 
making in complex environments. This thesis proposes a procedure to 
support knowledge-acquisition in environments where absent feedback 
loops would otherwise impede learning processes. Adaptations of the 
system, reflecting expectations with regard to future developments based 
on anticipatory thinking, can be initially tested and compared. The 
approach, furthermore, indicates means by which the creative process of 
imagining possible future developments could be assisted, i.e. it sug-
gests that the decomposition of the area in question into subcomponents 
and the presentation of reasonable element choices to the user can raise 
the level of creativity.  
Security checks at airports are a major concern in the field of air 
transport, as they present a serious obstacle to the offering of a smooth 
and hassle-free journey to the passenger. From an airport management 
point of view, the reactive implementation procedure dominant today 
deprives airport operators of planning certainty since sudden regulatory 
changes could fundamentally change, for example, floor space necessary 
for security check points or costs evoked by security processes. A change 
in thinking towards proactive airport security management would first 
and foremost improve the overall level of security as innovative threats 
might already be counteracted when they first appear. Furthermore, a 
threat-oriented approach would help to identify redundant or unneces-
sary process steps and could finally lead to a more efficient setup of the 
airport security system. 
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The application of the Multiple Domain Matrix approach to the concerns 
of airport security introduced a new area of research to the methodology. 
The requirements of this field of application went beyond the borders of 
the methodology in a number of ways. For example, the restriction of 
the methodology to the documentation of pairwise interrelations had to 
be overcome. Furthermore, the large size and the complexity of the 
documented system made it necessary to develop a user interface that 
would guide the data extraction process. New ways of analysing the 
results were developed and tested. From the point of view of Scenario 
Technology it was also necessary to change the standard procedures to 
be able to accommodate the specific challenges of airport security. The 
enhanced approach demonstrates how large systems can be handled 
within the scope of Scenario Technology, despite their high number of 
elements.  
The theoretical conceptions presented in this thesis, the creation of the 
Scenario Builder and the means suggested to analyse the resulting data 
provide the basis for subsequent steps towards proactive airport security 
management. Future work in this area should investigate the applicabil-
ity of the approach in real-world settings. A necessary first step in this 
direction is the design of experimental settings to test how the Scenario 
Builder can add to the understanding of the system’s components and 
interrelations. Furthermore, it is important to experimentally investigate 
how and to what extent the tool can lead to more creative ideas for 
possible future threats and their countermeasures. Once the capabilities 
of the approach have been determined, an exploration of how the meth-
odology can be employed to the advantage of the objectives of the securi-
ty system can be set in motion. To this end, the acknowledgement of the 
relevance of anticipatory thinking to address possible future threats by 
the stakeholders involved in airport security is of fundamental im-
portance. A very interesting line of future research in this context would 
be to investigate how creativity is treated in organizational contexts and 
how its relevance can be promoted within corporate culture.  
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Another open question in the organizational context is how the security 
system should be adapted on the basis of identified possible future 
threats. Today the airport security system is strictly determined by 
national and international rules and regulations. The power of the 
airport operator or security provider to singlehandedly design elements 
of the security measures according to their own perception of current 
risk and possible future threats is almost nonexistent. In this context, 
who would be held responsible for failures of the system if binding 
regulations were relaxed would constitute an unanswered question. One 
of the major challenges to operators with regard to security is to run the 
airport system as efficiently as possible while at the same time perma-
nently providing a high level of security. As the threat from malevolent 
organizations is constantly evolving, it might not be necessary to exert all 
security measures available at all times. In a modular approach to the 
airport security process, steps could be flexibly inserted or removed. 
With such an approach the measures executed could be adapted in 
accordance with the currently perceived level of risk and possible future 
threats identified as relevant. This security system would encompass as 
few restrictions as possible but, at the same time, be as extensive as 
current and future threats dictate.  
This dissertation demonstrates how a proactive approach to airport 
security management can be grounded in psychological research on 
decision making and creativity. Fundamental requirements for such an 
approach have been discussed and the Scenario Builder presented as a 
possibility to address these challenges. How insights gained from a 
better understanding of underlying system interrelations and a support-
ive attitude to creativity can be habitually exploited on an organizational 
level still remains an unanswered question. It is a challenge for future 
research to provide empirical evidence for the suggested methodology 
and identify ways of incorporating anticipatory approaches into organi-
zational structures.   
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During the last decades the air transport system has been 
repeatedly under attack. As reactions to such incidents many 
layers of security measures have been introduced throug-
hout the system, allowing potential attackers to continuously 
remain one step ahead. Against this background it is impor-
tant to develop an approach aiming at proactive airport se-
curity management. This has to be based on in-depth know-
ledge of elements and interrelations of the security system 
and should allow inclusion of creative, out of the box ideas 
for novel incidents and attacks.
The development of a software tool fulfilling these challen-
ges, the so-called Scenario Builder, has been pursued in the 
course of this dissertation. The methodological foundations, 
its functionality and use as well as possible ways to analyse 
the resulting data are presented in this work. The main part 
of the thesis is comprised of four publications dealing with 
different aspects of the developed methodology. Emphasis 
is placed on the strongly interdisciplinary character of the 
topic, mainly based in the fields of psychology and aviation 
management.
